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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in Energy Management at the Interna-
tional Hellenic University. The aim of the study is to investigate possible integration of 
hydrous ethanol and gasoline price in Brazil at state level for the period 2002-2015. Ini-
tially, the historical framework of the domestic ethanol market is described towards over-
all understanding of the topic. Then by employing a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model 
of all 27 Brazilian states, Johansen cointegration test investigates possible cointegration 
of both price series at state level. Impulse Response Functions are implemented within 
the pairwise time series analysis. A Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) provides 
long-run elasticities of ethanol price with respect to gasoline price for the cointegrated 
states. Within a panel data context panel unit root tests examine stationarity at levels and 
first differences. Finally, panel cointegration is examined through Pedroni and Kao panel 
cointegration tests and FMOLS on aggregate level. 
Regarding results, Johansen test provides evidence of co-movement between the price 
series in 10 out of the 27 Brazilian states. The long-run elasticities of ethanol price with 
respect to gasoline price for the cointegrated states range from 1.07% to 1.66% providing 
an average value of 1.33%. Impulse response functions reveal a relatively overall higher 
response of log_price_ethanol to a unitary shock in log_price_gasoline than the reverse 
case, with a levelling-off process within the twelve-month horizon of 2016, except for the 
case of Tocantins. Regarding panel data analysis, IPS and ADF Fisher panel unit root 
tests prove that both price series are 𝐼(1) at all states and 𝐼(0) when first differenced 
again at all states. Pedroni and Kao panel cointegration test output is if favor of panel 
cointegration. Finally, FMOLS provide an aggregate long-run elasticity estimate of 1.30 
that is almost identical to the value provided by the time series approach. 
I wish to thank Mr. Panagiotidis for his guidance. The dissertation is dedicated to my 
parents for their support and inspiration throughout my academic course.  
 
Christina-Eleni-Triada Kormazou 
23/12/2016 
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1 Introduction 
Throughout history, energy use has been dominated by the consumption of a single en-
ergy source that overcomes the remaining substitutes. First it was wood, then it was coal, 
moving to petroleum. That transition occurred due to the gradual substitution from one 
resource to the other and not because of depletion of the corresponding resources [53]. 
With global population approaching 7.5 billion in 2016, demand for food, fuels and en-
ergy follows an upward route. The growing risk of oil (volatility), increasing costs of 
exploration and geopolitical factors in oil producing countries have initiated an era of 
continuous research for oil substitutes, since ensuring reasonable oil prices during the 
next years is questionable. Furthermore, severe environmental effects of fossils being re-
flected on each corner of the globe intensify research towards cleaner energy resources 
that will eliminate global warming and energy security concerns [10]. 
Biofuels could be an answer to that list of concerns. US, Brazil and EU are three main 
biofuel markets, with the two former producing ethanol and the latter producing biodiesel. 
Among biofuels, ethanol serves as a crucial economic weapon because of the variability 
of agricultural products it can be derived from and the high level of substitutability with 
gasoline [10]. It can be produced from sugarcane, corn, wheat, sugar beetroot and barley. 
However, corn in US and sugarcane in Brazil are the most representative ethanol markets 
on the globe.  
Within that framework, Brazil has been investing on renewable energy for the last 90 
years, having built a model of sugarcane production, distribution and consumption that 
can experience application in many countries. Fuel market in Brazil is distinguished from 
other markets due to its diversified motif. The country is the dominant producer as well 
as exporter of sugar and sugarcane [50] and the second leading ethanol producer and 
consumer after United States [52]. From 1980 the existence of ethanol vehicles estab-
lished a still low rate substitutability between the two fuels due to the technological lim-
itations. The introduction of flex fuel technology in 2003 has established a distinct rela-
tionship between ethanol and gasoline within its domain. The fact that this technology 
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allows for partial substitution of gasoline with ethanol in any blend ratio and perfect sub-
stitution since it allows for use of pure ethanol, creates a more tight substitutability be-
tween ethanol and gasoline and, thus is an indication of co-movement of the prices. Also, 
Proálcool program created economies of scale, which combined with flex fuel technol-
ogy, caused ethanol cost of production to be lower than oil supply cost at regional level, 
which is unique internationally [6]. 
In that context, the understanding of price dynamics within that market could be a pre-
cious tool for scientists, policy makers and producers of developed and developing coun-
tries towards reversing the well-known paradox:  
“This is something that, every time I think about it, I imagine how could human kind 
become dependent on something that is going to finish some day?....How could, in less 
than 50 years, because it was in the first half of the 20th century, the whole human kind 
become dependent on something that is going to be eliminated….Each country can (now) 
have its own 'oil deposits'.” 
                                                  Roberto Rodrigues- Agriculture Minister of Brazil (2006) 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the interaction between sugarcane hydrous ethanol 
and gasoline price in Brazil. Section 2 provides a historical overview of ethanol market 
in Brazil with a focus on Proálcool program towards ensuring a spherical perception of 
the topic. Section 3 provides an extensive literature overview of every approach attempted 
up to date ranging from theoretical aspects to methodological approaches. Section 4 pre-
sents the methodological framework to be adopted that consists of two main parts: a time 
series pairwise approach and a panel data approach. Initially, in time series analysis, Jo-
hansen cointegration tests investigate the possible integration between the logarithmic 
transformation of ethanol and gasoline price for each 27 states of Brazil. Long run elas-
ticities and speed of adjustment are reported regarding the cointegrated states, while im-
pulse responses provide a twelve-month pseudo-forecast regarding 2016. Within panel 
data analysis, Im-Pesaran-Shin and ADF- Fischer panel unit root tests investigate station-
arity both at levels and first differences. Finally, cointegration is examined through Ped-
roni and Kao panel cointegration tests at state level and through FMOLS on aggregate 
level. Section 5 presents the abovementioned test output. Finally, section 6 provides con-
cluding remarks, a brief summary of the results and a policy proposal as a tool for poli-
cymakers with the aim of ethanol establishment in international markets.
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2 Historical Overview 
Since the share of ethanol in the national energy matrix has changed throughout the years, 
due to reasons related to institutional and economic structure as well as technological 
progress and environmental concerns, a historical overview is mandatory towards provi-
sion of an insight of the variables to be investigated. 
Proálcool Program  
Throughout history, Proálcool has experienced several phases, reflecting priorities in 
terms of economy, politics and energy security. Energy policy was the main pillar in the 
governmental program in 1970, being replaced by environmental targets in 1980 and pri-
vatization, competitiveness and globalization in 1990s [48]. Rosillo-Calle and Cortez 
(1998) have identified several phases, the chronological structure of which analysis is to 
be approximated until the period of their study. 
 
Pre-Proálcool era 
In 1533 sugarcane was first brought to Brazil establishing a benchmark socioeconomic 
era between 1500 and 1600, the so called “sugar cycle”. It describes the production of 
sugar in Northeast region of Brazil aimed at exports towards European countries, initiat-
ing an era of massive exports and integration with international market [23]. 
The history of ethanol within fuel use perspective dates back in 1925 when 150 million 
liters were produced annually [36]. In 1931 fuel distributors were authorized to blend 
gasoline with anhydrous ethanol up to 5% per volume, while Institute of Sugar and Alco-
hol was established by the Government Vargas. In 1941 ethanol production reached 650 
million liters [10, 36]. Until that era, support of ethanol production mainly focused on 
stabilizing sugar-market fluctuations [6]. 
In 1970s Brazil was mainly dependent on petroleum, importing 80% of oil consumed and 
spending 50% of total foreign goods on gasoline, due to inequality between domestic oil 
consumption and production [11]. The first and second oil crises in 1974 and 1979 se-
verely hit the country, threatening the ‘economic miracle’, resulting in serious concerns 
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of the Brazilian military dictatorship [48]. The increasing oil prices (from 2.70 US dollars 
to 11.50 US dollars), could lead to domestic inflation and problems in balance of pay-
ments [53]. Thus, it was urgent to eliminate dependence on oil imports, and promote fuel 
diversification towards alleviation of external debts and security of supply [11]. Another 
important factor was that the colossal investment of sugar industry towards modernization 
in response to high international sugar prices faced high uncertainty when sugar price hit 
the bottom. Energy consumption had to remain at least constant, to ensure economic 
growth and political stability [23]. 
 
Phase I (1975 - 1978) 
In 15 November 1975, in response to this series of events, the government sponsored two 
large-scale programs towards substitution of imported oil with domestic energy sources 
and insertion of biofuels to the energy-mix of Brazil. The first program focused at explo-
ration of domestic off-shore oil basins to increase petroleum reserves. The second, namely 
Programa Nacional do Álcool , also known as “Proálcool”, aimed at 1) promoting energy 
independence by reducing fossil consumption, especially on transportation sector, 2) in-
voking industrial and technological innovations and 3) enhancing sugar/sugarcane indus-
try[38]. Furthermore, Nuclear Program and Pro Oleo towards substitution of diesel from 
vegetable oil were planned [48]. 
The low levels of sugar prices during this era provoked diverting partial sugarcane pro-
duction towards ethanol production [15, 50]. The facts that further boosted Proálcool 
according to Borges (1990) were: 1) technological know-how in production of ethanol 
and consumption of ethanol blends, 2) abundance of fertile areas, appropriate climate 
conditions for low-cost production, unskilled labor force and 3) already existing sugar-
production facilities that could produce ethanol with negligible additional investments. 
Ethanol prices were set at 64.5% of gasoline [36]. 
During that phase governmental incentives towards promotion of ethanol production of 
both hydrous and anhydrous ethanol were numerous [24]. Governmental structure 
(CINAL) that aimed at evaluating, supporting and financing of the projects was imple-
mented. The existing infrastructure of sugar mills was enhanced with distilleries for eth-
anol production. However, this era was marked by the dispute among the government and 
the automobile industry that hampered the program [48], while Petrobras, the monopolis-
tic state-owned oil company, had control on domestic sales and distribution of ethanol, a 
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situation which would work as a barrier and indirect way of government control through-
out the decades [31]. 
 
Phase II (1979 - 1984) 
In 1979, establishment of National Executive Commission (CENA) and National Council 
for Alcohol (CNAL) and the cooperation of Government with car industry took place, 
due to settlement of the past dispute [48]. At the same year, with the continuous stimula-
tion of Brazilian government, Brazilian automobile industry proceeded with the launch-
ing of vehicles that could be fueled entirely on hydrous ethanol. Ethanol-dedicated car 
owners could now only use ethanol, while gasoline car owners could use gasoline [49]. 
The car owner could adapt the car engine for the other fuel in a garage, involving high 
sunk costs, time lost and cost of depreciation due to the mechanical incompatibility of the 
cars towards the alternative fuel that caused problems. Thus, substitutability of the two 
fuels remained very low [21]. Ferreira, Prado and Silveira (2009) explain that the promo-
tion of the car was quickly damaged due to scarcity of ethanol in gas stations at early 
stages and the long time demanded for the car to warm during winter months. 
During that phase, high governmental control, development of autonomous distilleries 
and production of hydrous ethanol for single use characterized the program [48]. Govern-
ment took advantage of high oil prices, setting price of ethanol below both its own cost 
and gasoline price, acting as a cross-subsidy towards ethanol. R&D at agricultural and 
industrial sector received sponsorship and ethanol distillers received direct subsidies. 
Moreover, tax exemptions in ethanol-dedicated car acquisition and property occurred 
[49]. Furthermore, reduction of ethanol production costs was further achieved by “learn-
ing-by doing” process [24], which resulted in enhanced agricultural techniques and man-
agement and use of sugarcane ethanol in energy sector, making ethanol competitive in 
fuels market [53]. 
This resulted in increased ethanol consumption during the 1980s with a peak in 1985 
when the majority (95.8%) of domestic purchases in light vehicles were ethanol-dedicated 
[53]. It, also, helped to honor the country’s external debt and control the imports of oil 
[2]. Furthermore the mid-west regions together with south and south-east displaced the 
north-east region from the role of ethanol industrial center [53]. The increase in ethanol 
production had huge amounts of surplus ethanol as consequence, leading Petrobras, to-
wards expensive restructuring or oil refinement [48]. 
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Phase III (1985 - 1989) 
In the late 1980s, the growth of ethanol market was gradually hampered. Brazilian econ-
omy faced increased inflation and foreign debt. The democratization of the political sys-
tem together with low crude oil prices in international markets left ethanol supply behind 
in the list of concerns. The sales of ethanol-dedicated vehicles were drastically limited (to 
50% of initial levels) due to the public sector meltdown followed by civilian administra-
tion. The latter, resulted in support reduction in terms of subsidies as well as the with-
drawal of price support to ethanol producers. Inferior taxation towards ethanol was no 
longer an adequate incentive for acquisition of hydrated alcohol vehicles. In addition to 
those factors, the appreciated sugar prices in contrast with the low crude oil prices led to 
the hault of ethanol market growth. Moreover, the restructuring of the global political 
scene after the U.S.S.R. collapse and the low import costs of both fuels acted as discour-
aging factors [48]. Furthermore, the discovery of new oil fields within the Brazilian do-
main and the fact that Petrobras had now the choice not to purchase all ethanol production, 
fueled the worsening of the situation [49]. 
 
Phase IV (1990 - 1994) 
Since that decade, governmental control over ethanol production, domestic consumption, 
exports and any type of price control was further eliminated. The only forms of govern-
mental intervention were tax incentives and the ethanol blending mandate measures [7]. 
Low ethanol production together with the high use of ethanol cars, led to a shortage of 
ethanol supply, which acted as a discouraging factor for consumers [10]. The official end 
of Proálcool followed the shut-down of CNAL and CENA in 1991. Only CINAL contin-
ued to have responsibilities over energy policy [48]. 
Realizing the rapid decline in car sales, the government proceeded with supportive 
measures towards ‘popular cars’ [48]. With the reduced role of the state, periodical sup-
portive purchases and sales from strategic domestic reserves were implemented in order 
to provide market balance. In 1993 a new law mandated blending ratio of 20-25% [22]. 
Ethanol imports rose in order to defy ethanol supply shortages, generating a further con-
fidence crisis in ethanol users [10]. Salvo and Huse (2011) argue that in 1994 less than 
10% among new car sales were ethanol-fueled cars. This could, also, be the result of 
stabilization program, known as Real Plan, that was initiated in July 1994 [48] causing 
foreign goods to be cheaper, among which were cars, boosting car imports. 
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Phase V (1995 - 2002) 
The poor agenda of the new administration on energy sector and the prioritized inflation 
trimming, led to further negligence towards important programs of Brazilian economy 
[48]. Ethanol-dedicated car sales were brought to zero [36]. In 1996, Real Plan brought 
inflation to 10% [48]. Also, the transition to liberalization of domestic fuel prices took 
place, with liberalization of gasoline prices in 1996, of anhydrous ethanol in 1997 and of 
hydrous ethanol prices in 1999 [24]. “Law of petroleum” introduced free prices and entry 
to agents that were not allowed to participate before, inducing privatization in energy 
sector [50]. This liberalization was also partly consequence of efficiency and production 
cost evolution. 
In 1997 the combination of real disposable income increase and trimmed inflation caused 
tax reduction [2]. According to Moreira and Goldemberg (1997) subsidies were only pro-
vided to Northeast region producers to enhance the regional character of production. Fur-
thermore, the power on ethanol distribution acted by Petrobras was eliminated [31]. In 
1997, establishment of National Agency Policy Council, the regulatory framework for 
biofuels and National Agency of Petroleum, Natural gas and Biofuels initiated a new era 
for the Program [6]. In 2000, oil prices followed a rising trend again while sugar prices 
started to fall [49]. Sugarcane industry faced a rapid growth due to rising ethanol demand. 
Private investments towards ethanol-only plants flourished, with a gradual adding of a 
sugar mill for production diversification in eras of unfavorable price of ethanol [23]. 
 
Phase VI (2003 - 2007) 
In March 2003, a pioneering innovation caused a radical shift in light vehicle fuel market. 
Flex fuel vehicles (FFVs hereafter), launched by Volkswagen, could run on any arbitrary 
proportion of gasoline and hydrous ethanol from G100 (pure gasoline) to E100 (pure eth-
anol), without operational limitations [10, 49]. According to Pacini (2011) this enabled 
consumers to react immediately to price signals by costlessly exploiting price differential 
in ethanol and gasoline and switch from one fuel to the other unlike in the past when the 
only decision to be taken was whether to use a car run on gasoline instead of a car run on 
ethanol, resulting in increasing substitutability [10, 38, 53]. Additionally, the only form 
of governmental intervention was still setting the ethanol to gasoline blend ratio and tax 
incentives, with no control over domestic production, sales and export quotas on etha-
nol/sugar [6]. 
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In 2005-2006, 50% of sugarcane production was dedicated to ethanol, adequate enough 
to fuel one fifth of Brazil’s transportation. High international oil prices in that period (as 
also noted in several months of 2002-2003), boosted ethanol demand [24] and caused 
ethanol prices to increase [46]. Increased demand of sugarcane in Brazil in 2006, resulted 
in doubling of international sugar prices within the year. Furthermore, countries seeking 
to abide by Kyoto Protocol agreement, payed special attention to renewable develop-
ments, including sugarcane ethanol [5]. In 2006, the government got in charge of ensuring 
collision to the environmental standards of the sector and its smooth restructure towards 
market rules. 
 
Phase VII (2008 - 2016) 
This phase is described in literature as a period of stagnation on the ground of economic 
crisis. According to Gilio and Moraes (2016) the economic crisis of 2008, severely hit 
ethanol production, resulting in the indebtedness of many units of production due to credit 
tightening. The need for loans and the high interest rate of international loans to finance 
the sugarcane mills caused investment drainage and high production costs [23]. Further-
more, until 2008, ethanol production was high because of Brazilian ethanol demand 
reaching high levels combined with low sugar price in international markets. However, 
in 2008, international sugar price initiated a rising trend, leading sugarcane production 
towards sugar production rather than ethanol production. 
Additionally, the reshaping of automobile industry led to ethanol being second in the rank 
of fuel consumption in transportation in Brazil in 2009, with a peak in 2010 (24.4 billion 
liters in contrast with 22.8 billion gasoline liters). This trend is attributed to the relatively 
low levels of ethanol and the ongoing increase in sales of FFVs, equal to 92% of domestic 
car supply in 2009 according to Boff(2010), establishing the flex fuel technology as the 
main in the country [38]. From 2010, ethanol lost its competitive character against gaso-
line, due to the insufficient role of sugarcane crops and production of ethanol [51]. The 
downward trend in sugarcane production in 2011-2013 period lead to the sugarcane in-
dustry crisis. An immediate consequence was the shut-down of many facilities [35]. 
The discouraged ethanol production that was initiated in 2008 and the problems in infra-
structure investments were enhanced by poor harvests within 2012 caused by bad weather 
conditions and dollar exchange rate, resulting in reduction of ethanol domestic supply. 
On the contrary, the dominant acceptance of flex fuel cars and the blending mandate 
17 
pushed ethanol demand upwards, resulting in a rather high ethanol price promoting higher 
substitution of gasoline for ethanol and increasing substitutability [3, 15, 23]. 
According to Blanchard, Sharma and Raza (2015), in 2014 gasoline prices reached bot-
tom after a 5 year decrease. This in combination with the growing ethanol prices led to a 
price ratio different from the historical one, due to the switch in gasoline prices, making 
ethanol addition more costly, leading to uncertainties about its future. Availability of 
credit and consumer income were key determinants of increased flex-fuel car ownership 
in both rural and urban middle-class consumers, which surpassed 50% of total light-car 
fleet [51]. In February 2015, the Brazilian Government applied an increase in gasoline 
federal taxes, reaching 0.22 R$/ l, generating high ethanol competitiveness. Furthermore, 
several states reduced ethanol state tax and raised the gasoline state tax (reaching a 10% 
differential in some states), resulting in a further enhancement of ethanol competitiveness. 
Blending ratio of 27% of anhydrous ethanol was authorized in March 2015 by the gov-
ernment [7]. 
According to Santos and Colomer (2014) recovery towards ethanol’s past leading role is 
debatable. Projections show that an increase in ethanol prices caused by an increase in 
ethanol demand and a resulting shortage of supply, may lead to the weakening of com-
petitiveness in both domestic-global market, which highlights the importance of the 
study. 
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3 Literature Review 
The historical role of ethanol within Brazilian fuels market has been approached from 
various perspectives depending on the focal point of each researcher and the idiosyncrasy 
of Brazilian market that sets different regimes of approach. An overview of the up-to-
date distinct categorizations of related bibliography is provided. 
3.1 Historical Era Division Approach 
In terms of historical era division, Freitas and Kaneko (2011) argue the separation of 
ethanol demand in three historical eras. The first occurs in early 1970s with the introduc-
tion of Proálcool and the resulting increased ethanol demand. The second is between 
1980s and 1990s with a decline due to the period of stagnation. The third is in 2000s when 
radical increase in demand of hydrous ethanol occurred. Santos and Colomer (2014), di-
vide the post 2003 period in three sub-eras. FFV penetration in slow rate in 2003-2005 is 
followed by 2006-2009 with the rapid growth and establishment of the technology in 
Brazilian transport network, with post-2010 period initiating a less favorable era for eth-
anol. Rosillo- Calle and Cortez (1998) provide an approach which has been approximated 
in the Historical Overview of the present study. 
3.2 Economic Approach 
According to Costa Cunha and Guilhoto (2011), a supply-side approach reveals an inter-
relationship between ethanol and sugar: 1) Sugar and ethanol both have sugarcane as in-
put and thus are competitors in its demand. On the other hand, 2) ethanol used to be a 
sugar by-product which boosted its competitiveness and thus competition between the 
two products should be questioned. Furthermore, a demand-side approach indicates that 
ethanol is both substitute and complement for gasoline which is a characteristic met only 
in Brazil: 1) introduction of ethanol as gasoline substitute towards Brazil’s independence 
from global oil price variations and the introduction of flex fuel technology allowing for 
any combination of both fuels and 2) complements because of blending mandate up to 
27% resulting in gasohol, which in other countries hardly approaches 10% [16,15]. The 
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dominance of the substitute role over the complementary nature of the two fuels’ rela-
tionship is revealed by the similarity of their trends and the increased popularity of flex-
fuel technology [15]. The increased substitutability of both fuels requires investigation of 
elasticities, which has been attempted in many studies. Moreover, according to Boff 
(2010), demand is determined by the 70% price parity as will be explained below, while 
Ferreira, Prado and Silveira (2009) argue that ethanol cannot be studied in case it is 
disentangled from gasoline. 
3.3 Technical Approach 
In terms of ethanol-gasoline technical interrelationship, ethanol boosts octane, improves 
performance and decreases carbon dioxide emissions of conventional gasoline when 
mixed to provide gasohol [11, 22]. Its lower calorific value compared to gasoline, results 
in less km/h when run on ethanol instead of gasoline. Balance between performance of 
combustion and fuel price choice of ethanol instead of gasoline occurs when per liter price 
of the first is 70% of the latter, establishing price parity between the two fuels and cap-
turing loss of technical efficiency [50]. So conversion of prices per liter to prices per 
energy unit change the relevant price relationship between both [5]. This number is cru-
cial in several papers investigating the demand side of ethanol, since consumers are ex-
pected to switch to ethanol when its price level is below 60-70% the gasoline price, oth-
erwise they are indifferent [10,49]. 
Within that perspective, Ferreira, Prado and Silveira (2009) suggest the approach of 
competition among ethanol and gasoline producers, on the logic that the FFV develop-
ment should result in the ratio of prices of gasoline and ethanol reaching a 70% relation-
ship in terms of replacement. But, the applied time series approach fails to provide such 
result. Furthermore, Salvo and Huse (2011) suggest the same technical relationship on a 
theoretical basis. Moreover, Boff (2010), investigating the long term relationship between 
ethanol, gasoline and sugar, suggests that mean fuel prices rise before converging to the 
70%. Freitas and Kaneko (2011), argue that during that transformation from physical to 
energy units, ethanol falls from the second to third most consumed fuel. They are also the 
first to include energy units in their study. Finally, Du and Carriquiry (2011) and Santos 
(2013) set 70% as threshold in their cointegration and panel data analysis respectively. 
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3.4 Regional Approach 
Brazil consists of 27 states, that is: Acre, Alagoas, Amapá, Amazonas, Bahia, Ceará, Dis-
trito Federal, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas 
Gerais, Pará, Paraíba, Paraná, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte, 
Rio Grande do Sul, Rondônia, Roraima, Santa Catarina, São Paulo, Sergipe and Tocan-
tins.  
São Paulo is the state with the most established industry in sugarcane ethanol production 
in Brazil, accounting for 42% of consumption while being the main ethanol exporter in 
the country. In 2014 it represented 50% of Brazilian biofuel market. Thus, its leading role 
in affecting both fuel’s consumption reflecting Brazil’s trends is highlighted by Santos 
and Colomer (2014) who focus their study on São Paulo. However, with an area covering 
over 8.515.767 km2, Brazil approaches continental dimensions. Thus, the socioeconomic 
and demographic structure of the country presents great distinctions from state to state 
[23,35]. An indicative distinction is the 100% mechanized harvesting process in many 
regions, in contrast to the manual labor methods used in other, accounted for in many 
studies [35]. So, instead of analyzing the market on aggregate level by using average 
values for the country that may affect the results since it does not account for the distinct 
characteristics of regional market, regional price dynamics are captured by the use of 
regional data, not allowing precious information to be lost.  
Silva, Tiryaki and Pontes (2009) use data from all federal states in their study pointing 
out the interstate differences. According to their study, ethanol market’s standard devia-
tion is two times greater than that of gasoline markets leading to 86% higher prices in 
states that are minor producers than São Paulo, and higher tax burden for that states. Silva, 
Vasconcelos, Vasconcelos and Mattos (2012) also adopt regional approach highlighting 
the regional distinct character of the asymmetries in city level. Freitas and Kaneko (2011) 
proceed to the division of Brazil into two regions, Central-South and North-Northeast due 
to higher socioeconomic indicators in the former providing higher price elasticity of eth-
anol. Moreover, since production is concentrated in a few states (São Paulo, Paraná, Mato 
Grosso and Goiás concentrate 80%) costs of transportation in Northern region are higher 
and there are significant differentiations in taxation, so distinct regional markets are 
formed [22, 53]. 
 
21 
3.5 Econometric Approach 
3.5.1 Cointegration Analysis 
Alves and Bueno (2003) using annual data from 1974 until 1999, analyze the long and 
short-run patterns of Brazilian gasoline demand and proceed with the cross-price elastic-
ity estimation of gasoline and ethanol, using cointegration analysis ( Engle and Granger 
approach). Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute provide data for population 
and disposable income, while ethanol and gasoline prices are derived from Economic 
Research Institute Foundation and gasoline consumption from the National Petroleum 
Agency. Real GDP per capita, real price of gasoline, per capita gasoline consumption 
(liters) and real ethanol price are proven to be I(1) and cointegrated. Price and income 
inelasticity of gasoline demand is found. Long-run gasoline price elasticity surpasses the 
short-run, while short and long-run income elasticities are the same. Furthermore, Alves 
and Bueno (2003), argue that ethanol and oil are imperfect substitutes in the long term 
that is suggested from low positive cross-price elasticity between them (0.48). This is 
attributed to the high cost of switching from gasoline to ethanol-fueled engines, since 
flex-fuel technology had not yet been introduced. 
Rapsomanikis and Hallam (2006) investigate the presence of nonlinear dynamic adjust-
ment of sugar, ethanol and oil within the 2005-2006 oil price hike context, by applying 
discrete two regime threshold cointegration method. Logarithmic transformations of 
weekly oil, ethanol and sugar price data in Brazil are used from 2000 to 2006. Unit root 
tests reveal non-stationarity for all prices at 5% significance level (α). Johansen tests 
(MLE/Max Likelihood) prove stationarity among all price pairs when applied on a VAR 
with drift and a trend (linear). Schwarz Information Criterion is used for lag length selec-
tion. Hansen and Seo Threshold VECM is estimated to examine linearity in the adjust-
ment of the prices of ethanol-sugar, ethanol-oil and sugar-oil through Johansen MLE 
method. So, through SupLM0 test threshold nonlinear cointegration is supported for 
sugar-oil and ethanol-oil pairs and linear cointegration in sugar- ethanol pair. Estimated 
cointegrating parameter equals 0.64 for sugar-oil pair, 0.60 for ethanol-oil and 0.87 for 
sugar-ethanol pair. Granger Causality tests determine the direction of causality. Oil 
Granger-causes sugar and ethanol prices in the long-term. In sugar-ethanol pair sugar is 
found to be weakly exogenous. Oil has determining role in the nexus in linear and thresh-
old VECM, while no causality is found from oil towards ethanol to sugar. So, sugar is 
affected by changes in oil price in a direct way. An extreme and a typical regime are 
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present. Faster adjustment (extreme regime that is 20 times faster for sugar and four times 
faster for ethanol), occurs when prices are 2% below the long-term mean for sugar and 
20% for ethanol. So with speed of adjustment depending on the nature of disequilibria 
(positive-negative), sugar-oil and ethanol oil nonlinear relationship is asymmetric. Fi-
nally, the combination of widening of oil-ethanol spread and ethanol prices being below 
the critical threshold, makes ethanol prices’ dynamic adjustment faster. 
Balcombe and Rapsomanikis (2008) build a Bayesian method to examine the non-linear-
ity in adjustment in Brazilian sugar, ethanol and world oil prices using again price pairs. 
Logarithmic transformations of weekly data from 2000 to 2006 are used to capture the 
effect of FFV technology, high world oil prices and the doubled sugar prices in 2005-
2006. Data is provided by UNICA. Apart from use of standard linear models (VECM) 
that is empirically supported only for sugar-ethanol pair, extensions of VECM, such as 
Taylor approximation for unknown nonlinearity, a second model allowing for asymme-
tries (oil-sugar-price pair) and a threshold model(on oil-ethanol pair) are used. Instead of 
estimating the threshold location parameter and identify it indirectly, as in past studies, 
Balcombe and Rapsomanikis (2008) estimate the population of observations that are 
within the boundaries of a symmetric threshold interval (40% lie outside the interval). 
Results characterize oil prices as determinants of sugar and ethanol prices in the long term 
with no opposite direction of price transmission, since they are strongly exogenous. Fur-
thermore, sugar and ethanol are adjusted in a linear way, while the other price pairs are 
adjusted nonlinearly. More specifically ethanol and oil experience threshold adjustment, 
while sugar and oil experience asymmetric adjustment. Causality runs from oil prices to 
sugar rather directly, not through ethanol market. So oil spikes may be the cause of sugar 
price changes, rather than ethanol. Granger causality is found from sugar to ethanol 
prices. So, prices are transmitted from oil to sugar to ethanol. 
Ferreira, Prado and Silveira (2009), applying a close investigation to Alves and Buenos’ 
(2003) approach, study the impact of flex fuel technology on Brazilian fuel price dynam-
ics, the ethanol-gasoline price dynamics, and the consumers’ decision on car choice 
within the Brazilian market. They fill past literature gap by considering demand and sup-
ply in their analysis and investigating the short-run and long-run relative price behavior. 
They use both monthly data from 2002 to 2006 and annual data from 1976 to 2004 for 
high and low frequency, with the former due to total liberalization of both prices initiating 
a reasonable era of cointegration analysis, unlike previous era of co-movement due to 
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strict control. Ethanol data is provided by the Centre for Advanced Studies on Applied 
Economics of the University of São Paulo (CEPEA). Gasoline data is obtained from ANP. 
Annual consumer prices are derived from Institute of Applied Economics Research 
(IPEA). Unit roots applied on high frequency data, reveal non-stationarity. Stohastic time 
trend is insignificant. Unit root tests on annual dataset reveal non-stationarity since the 
break of liberalization in 1997 is captured only in annual dataset. Using Perron test, the 
same results as monthly data are obtained. Engle and Granger and Johansen tests for coin-
tegration reveal cointegration for both datasets. An ARDL lag model of two lags shows 
relationship between gasoline, ethanol and fractions of the car types (ethanol, gasoline 
and FFV). Partial cointegration model is then applied. Strong cointegration is proven be-
tween energy prices, suggesting that substitutability is higher than Alves and Bueno’s 
suggestion. On monthly basis, ethanol price changes eliminate deviations from the long-
run up to 30%. By applying Wald tests of causality, gasoline is found to Granger- cause 
ethanol. The speed of adjustment in the long run is found to be constant(0.52), lower than 
0.70, due to currently small share of FFVs, despite their growth, suggesting that price 
dynamics are not affected by FFV technology yet. Also, if price of all car types is set 
equal and variation of gasoline prices is within rational levels, owning a flex car will 
always be advantageous for consumers enabling them to exploit price differentials.  
Boff (2011) investigates the effect of ethanol/sugar and ethanol/gasoline price ratios in 
the long-term equilibrium and the contribution of flex technology demand in shaping eth-
anol market. São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro focused data covers July 2001-March 2010. 
Ethanol and gasoline prices are derived from ANP, while prices of crystal sugar traded in 
Brazil are derived from CEPEA-ESALQ. Prices in Rio de Janeiro are described by more 
volatility than in São Paulo. Unit root tests including ADF, KPSS and UR-SB, based on 
AIC, SBIC and HQIC, on ethanol, sugar and gasoline price indicate that levels are 𝐼(1) 
and the model is AR(2) with a drift. Johansen tests justify the hypothesis of cointegration. 
VECM model is used. Granger Causality test shows that sugar and gasoline Granger-
cause ethanol price. LR test provides one cointegrating relationship at  𝛼 = 5%. Flex fuel 
technology brings ethanol price transmission elasticity with respect to sugar and gasoline 
towards 1, leading to the separation of ethanol market with sugar market, removing the 
main factor that generates volatility in the market, freeing ethanol suppliers of the need 
to integrate sugar with ethanol market to hedge against risks. Specifically, ethanol price 
elasticity moves from 0.876 in São Paulo (0.944 in Rio) prior to 2004 to 0.930(0.970) 
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after 2006 with respect to gasoline, while from 0.114(0.040) to 0.170(0.030) with respect 
to sugar. So, ethanol price becomes less sensitive to sugar price through time, revealing 
a decreasing price transmission. Ethanol/gasoline price ratio converges to 70% price par-
ity. Speed of adjustment of ethanol in long- term is 1 year. Ethanol market is found to be 
more competitive at retail level. Price variations in retail are lower (+6.0% and 2.1%in 
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro respectively) than distribution level (+8.0% and 5%). 
The particularities of ethanol demand under the Brazilian fuel diversification within the 
post FFV development period are examined by Freitas and Kaneko (2011) with monthly 
data over 2003-2010. Inclusion of fleet as variable, use of energy units (National Energy 
Balance) and the econometric approach make the study different from previous literature. 
Ethanol demand is expressed in terms of ethanol price (ANP), average consumer income 
(Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics-IBGE), cross-effects with gasohol price 
and fleet growth. ANP provides fuel consumption data. Wald test is used to examine 
cointegration between ethanol demand and its own lagged value, ethanol and gasoline 
price, income and the number of cars. In the second stage of the analysis, dynamic spec-
ification (ARDL bound tests) is used towards estimation of the long-term coefficients. 
Model specification tests indicate that the effect of average family income on ethanol 
consumption is not statistically significant, which contradicts past literature. Enhanced 
independency of ethanol is proved. The growing substitutability between gasohol and 
gasoline, is justified by the symmetric operation of both prices’ dynamics over gasoline 
demand. In the short run, ethanol price-elasticity and gasoline cross-price elasticity are -
1.413 and 0.948, while in the long-run they are equal to -1.800 and 1.987 respectively, 
revealing a shorter time required for purchasing decisions, due to overcoming of technical 
limitations in FFV technology expansion. Finally, car fleet and flex fuel technology are 
mainly driving the ethanol demand increase after 2003. 
Du and Carriquiry (2011) study the Brazilian case to provide solutions for the implica-
tions in US ethanol market. Using averaged monthly data for ethanol, gasoline and sugar 
prices and monthly data for FFV shares and exports of ethanol for January 2005- October 
2010 period, they adopt a partial adjustment model to estimate the relative ethanol-to-
gasoline price dynamics. The relative ethanol-gasoline prices are found to be stationary 
(𝐼(0)). Hypothesis of sugar price exogeneity is based on Balcombe and Rapsomanikis’ 
(2012) results. Threshold test is used to investigate the splitting of the sample, with FFV 
share being the threshold variable. LM-test statistics equal to 24.2 prove the existence of 
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an estimated threshold of about 30%. The sample is divided into two subsets (regimes) 
that represent existence below and over the threshold. Mean reversion of relative prices 
is proven with speed of adjustment equal to 0.60. Sugar price strongly influences ethanol 
prices, while autocorrelation in errors exists. In regime 1, indicating that FFVs share in 
vehicle fleet does not exceed 30%, FFV shares and exports of ethanol are not significant, 
which is not the case under regime 2. 
Silva, Vasconcelos, Vasconcelos and Mattos (2014), using threshold Error Correction 
Model and momentum threshold Error Correction Model (TAR and MTAR respec-
tively),attempt an analysis of asymmetry in price transmission in gasoline markets of Bra-
zil linking it to the market power exercised and potential anticompetitive practices within 
the industry. Data consists of monthly average gasoline prices at wholesale and retail 
(ANP) for May 2004- February 2014 and 134 municipalities. Their breakthrough is the 
use of gasoline prices at distribution level to ensure that potential asymmetries occur at 
retail level. Data disaggregation reveals that asymmetry is a regional problem rather than 
national, so particular type of dominant asymmetry is rejected unlike past literature. 
Within threshold analysis, stationarity tests indicate that three cities present first differ-
enced time series that are 𝐼(1), enabling for the use of TAR ECM and MTAR models. 
Cointegration exists between 103 cities between retail and wholesale prices in TAR 
model and 96 in MTAR. Asymmetry tests on cointegrated municipalities end up in rejec-
tion of symmetry in 33 municipalities using the ECM TAR and 26 using the ECM MTAR 
model at 𝛼 = 10%. Increased symmetry is found in northeastern region, while increased 
asymmetry is found in southern region, due to a more competitive market. For TAR 
model, negative asymmetry in adjustment to equilibrium between wholesale and retail 
prices is present, while for MTAR model the results are unclear. Positive correlation with 
distributor prices is proven. Origin of asymmetric results cannot be attributed to spatial 
factors (unlike Nuñez and Otero (2015)), since data is based on one geographical scope 
resulting to a vertical analysis. 
Chen and Shaghaian (2015) study the price relationship between ethanol, sugar and oil 
considering for structural breaks points within the “2008 rising international sugar prices, 
peak of oil prices and initiation of ethanol price decline due to economic crisis” frame-
work. Crude oil prices are obtained from IEA, while ethanol price ($/gallon) and sugar 
price ($/kg) are obtained from CEPEA. They use weekly data from 2003 to 2014 in log-
arithmic form. Perron unit root test reveals non-stationarity for all prices at levels before 
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and after a shift is considered and significant coefficients of the variable that represent 
the mean shift. Breakpoints of about 20 in 2009 for ethanol and 2008 for sugar and oil are 
found. The latter date of ethanol break, reveals causality of the other two variables to 
ethanol. First differences are I(0) and now coefficients of the mean shift are not statisti-
cally significant. Johansen cointegration test is applied on VAR models. They split the 
sample into two sub-periods 2003-2008 and 2008-2014(weekly data) according to the 
breakpoints. During the first period no cointegration is found when Johansen test is ap-
plied at α = 5%, indicating that among the three price series only short-run interaction 
exists. Thus, a VAR model is estimated on first differenced variables. The results prove 
high autocorrelation in each time series, indicating that a change in previous period, 
highly affects the next period. Using Granger-causality tests, sugar is proven to Granger-
cause ethanol prices. Moreover, oil is proven to be the determinant for ethanol and sugar 
prices, but not vice versa. As for the second sub-era, existence of cointegration is proven, 
so price interrelationship is estimated through a VECM. Coefficients of adjustment are 
significant for all price equations, while oil is weakly exogenous to ethanol and sugar, 
confirming its leading role towards the long-run relationship formation among the three 
variables. The speed of adjustment, showing the disequilibrium error that is corrected in 
each time period, is 42.9% for ethanol, 3.39% for oil and 2.71% for sugar. 1.96% increase 
in price of ethanol is caused by 1% change in oil price, revealing tight linkage between 
both, fact that is provided by the cointegrating vector. Unit root presence on the error term 
is rejected by ADF test. 
3.5.2 Panel Data Analysis 
Silva, Tiryaki and Pontes (2009) investigate the impact of flex-fuel innovation on gaso-
line demand elasticity in Brazil. Using quarterly frequency from 2001 to 2006, they adopt 
panel data (Generalized Method of Moments-SYS) dynamic analysis for the 27 states of 
Brazil. Price and consumption data is obtained from ANP, whereas income and price 
indexes from IBGE. A shorter sample is also tested ranging from 2003-2007. Due to panel 
data unavailability prior to 2001, they compare the results with data from other studies 
which used time series analysis. Giving weight to regional effects, they eliminate the id-
iosyncrasy of each state in gasoline demand elasticity estimation. They investigate the 
post-FFV period and prove a significant increase in both price and the cross-price elas-
ticity of demand of gasoline due to the increasing share of ethanol in the fuel market. The 
former is equal to -0.945(statistically significant at 1%) pointing out the market shock 
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from FFV penetration, since a few observations from time period prior to that technology 
are included in the sample. The respective elasticity for the shorter time period is -1.505 
(statistically significant at 1%). Cross price elasticity is 0.049 (not statistically significant) 
and 0.611 (statistically significant at 1%) respectively. The deviation of that output from 
past literature that provides lower values may be attributed to the higher frequency data, 
the short time span and the technological shock. Income elasticity of demand is found to 
be 0.154 and 0.370 in each sample, close to past literature levels. A noteworthy finding 
is that the gasoline’s demand cross price to ethanol increased significantly and gasoline 
demand elasticity increased due to the higher share of ethanol in fuel market. 
Santos (2013) aims at examining both short and long-run price, cross price and income 
elasticity together with consumer adjustment coefficients of ethanol, gasoline and natural 
gas (compressed). Quarterly data for all states from 2001 to 2010 is used. Price and con-
sumption data of the fuels is obtained from ANP, price indexes and population infor-
mation from IBGE, while National Treasury of Brazil provided the tax data. Dynamic 
panel data and demand equations are applied within Generalized Method of Moments-
SYS analysis. A dummy variable evaluates the obedience of consumers to thresholds im-
posed by technological factors. Threshold is set at 70% based on ethanol-gasoline price 
parity. Short run gasoline price elasticity of -0.399 is close to past literature. Ethanol 
cross-price elasticity is equal to 0.099. Income elasticity of 0.0176 is close to Alves and 
Bueno’s (2003) result. Imperfect substitutability between Brazilian ethanol and gasoline 
is, thus, proven. Price elasticity of demand for gasoline is unaltered after introduction of 
flex technology. Ethanol price elasticity is equal to -1.252 revealing short-run price elas-
ticity for consumers, a rather unexpected result. High competition of gasoline and ethanol 
provides cross-price elasticity of 1.182 regarding gasoline, which is rather high and 0.098 
regarding CNG revealing weak competition between both fuels. Income elasticity is 
0.551. From CNG perspective, price elasticity is -0.178, cross price elasticity is 0.371 
with respect to gasoline, while that to ethanol is insignificant and income elasticity is 
0.139. Coefficients of adjustment are 0.036, 0.148 and 0.172 for gasoline, ethanol and 
CNG respectively, indicating that demand for three fuels is away (lower) from desired 
level. Finally, despite the absence of any indication of a long-run equilibrium from the 
results, Santos proceeds to estimation of long run elasticities. The values of -8.465, 7.991 
and 3.722 for price elasticity, cross price with respect to gasoline and income elasticity, 
respectively, justify the results of Silva, Tiryaki and Pontes (2009) who reveal existence 
of price elasticity of consumers in the long-run for all fuels. 
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Nuñez and Otero (2015) investigate the integration between the markets of gasoline and 
sugarcane ethanol in Brazil using weekly data from 2004 to 2014 and attempting incor-
poration of spatial considerations. Price data and number of gas stations is collected from 
ANP, while tax regime data is obtained from Department of Finance of the corresponding 
states. Data for vehicle population and gas stations is from the annual report of the De-
partamento Nacional de Trânsito and the annual report of ANP respectively. Population 
and area information is gathered from IBGE and information about cross-state distance 
is based on a Geographical Information System. The authors employ time series analysis 
using the Pesaran pairwise procedure (2007) to determine the level of market integration 
between gasoline and ethanol by identifying the population of stationary relationships 
between price differentials The ADF and ADFmax tests prove stationarity between 56.9% 
(at 5% significance level) of fuel differentials. Gasoline presents speed of adjustment 
equal to 6.4 weeks and ethanol 8.5 weeks due the differentiated transportation system. 
Consequently, using cross-section analysis they incorporate data on geographic and eco-
nomic level towards explanation of differing long-run speed of adjustment. They suggest 
that the greater the distance among states and the greater the differential in tax regimes, 
the lower the speed of adjustment of the fuels in the long-term equilibrium. Other possible 
determinants such as density of population, gas station population and per capita GDP are 
proven not to be statistically significant. Price differentials among the same fuel shows 
quicker adjustment than between the two fuels, with gasoline price differentials having 
the quicker speed of adjustment. 
Moraes, Bacchi and Caldarelli (2016) examine the influence of ethanol, sugar and sug-
arcane sectors on per capita municipal GDP in south-central sugarcane producing and 
processing regions in Brazil on municipal and regional basis for 2000-2008(annual). Data 
under consideration is labor market, average income, employment contracts (Brazilian 
Ministry of Labor and Employment), municipal land use, per capita GDP, per age popu-
lation and municipal grid (IBGE), existence or absence of sugar mill indicator (Brazilian 
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Supply and the Brazilian Sugarcane In-
dustry Association) and consumer price index (Brazilian Institute for Economic Re-
search).Apart from a theoretical model consisting of GDP determinants, the empirical 
part involves use of GMM-SYS for estimation of the theoretical model, while spatial dy-
namic panel data is used for direct(municipal) and indirect(regional) effect estimation for 
15 nearest municipalities as criterion. Real municipal per capita GDP grew by 1028$. 
Due to temporal-spatial effects it also grew by 324$ in their adjacent municipalities due 
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to direct and indirect effects. Effects of establishment of sugar mills and ethanol plants 
seem to persist for 10 years since initiation of operation and influences positively mainly 
the host municipality. Regional effects are greater in São Paulo than in the southcentral 
region. Finally, mass ethanol production has positive contribution to the GDP growth of 
southcentral Brazil. 
Gilio and Moraes (2016) approach the effect of the expansion of sugarcane industry in 
São Paulo during 2005-2011 on socioeconomic level building a dynamic spatial panel 
model with GMM-SYS method. Annual data for several municipalities of São Paulo on 
index of municipal development is provided by FIRJAN, while sugarcane area on munic-
ipality level, GDP per capita, population and area information is obtained from IBGE. 
Furthermore, rate of urbanization is derived from SEADE. Spatial dependence and spatial 
lags are included in analysis. Model is split into two sub-models, with Model I including 
all the variables of analysis, and Model II incorporating only the statistically significant 
ones. Arellano-Bond tests (1991) indicate absence of autocorrelation. Wald test proves 
adequacy of explanatory variables towards forecasting the dependent variable, while Sar-
gan test proves the model adequacy. Results indicate that the existence of sugar and eth-
anol plants has positive impact on areas they are located and the neighboring ones. Soci-
oeconomic development in a specific municipality is proven to be affected by neighboring 
ones and shows high correlation .Extension of sugarcane-dedicated areas has a negative 
impact due to damage in agriculture because of land lost for farming and mechanized 
procedures and jobs lost. 
3.5.3 Other Approaches 
Koizumi (2003) builds a dynamic partial equilibrium model to investigate the effect eth-
anol-gasoline blend ratio in Brazil has on the international markets of ethanol and sugar. 
Information on sugar and ethanol markets is obtained from FAOSTAT. Ethanol automo-
bile data is obtained from governmental reports. The ethanol-sugar world market model 
attempts to provide projections regarding production, consumption, exports for a time 
horizon reaching 2010. Results prove that maintaining the blending ratio would help Bra-
zil to have control on the domestic market and the international sugar market as well as a 
moderate, but persistent, effect on the international ethanol-sugar market. 
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Salvo and Huse (2011) investigate the effect of FFV penetration in Brazilian ethanol 
prices using monthly data for July 2001-September 2009 for the 27 states. Data for gaso-
line and ethanol price is collected from ANP, while for sugar from the International Sugar 
Agreement (ISA). They base their study on the 0.7 ethanol-to-gasoline price threshold, 
which hit a peak in 1985 reaching 0.96, showing that penetration of FFVs causes increas-
ing covariance between the two prices. Splitting the sample into two sub-periods, they 
prove that volatility of price ratio between ethanol and gasoline decreased during the sec-
ond sub-period. Volatility of relative ethanol prices in 25 out of 27 states drops about 
26% especially in north/northeast Brazil. Unit root tests on ethanol and gasoline level 
prices imply that in 6 states both prices are I(0) and in 11 states are I(1), in which 4 of 
these 11 states they are cointegrated(Johansen Test(1991)), while in the remaining 10, 
gasoline and ethanol prices have differing order of integration (either I(0) or I(1)). Sig-
nificant seasonality in ethanol price series and a structural break in November 2002 caus-
ing a shift in 24 and 20 of total 27 ethanol and gasoline price series, are noted respectively. 
Running causality test on VAR models for the 17 states of identical order of integration, 
they argue the presence of instantaneous causality between ethanol and gasoline prices 
and Granger causality of gasoline over ethanol. Salvo and Huse (2011) theoretically sup-
port that distance across states is an important determinant to the speed of adjustment in 
the price parity of ethanol and gasoline. They, however do not provide empirical evidence 
which is attempted by Nuñez and Otero (2015). 
Finally, Santos and Colomer (2014) investigate the correlation of gasoline and ethanol 
prices since 2003 and attempt to define ethanol pricing determinants. Average data during 
2003-2012 is collected from ANP, while GDP data is obtained from IBGE. Gasoline pric-
ing and ethanol sales that mirror production costs and taxes, in addition to weather con-
ditions, are investigated using OLS with gradual inclusion of independent variables(mul-
tiple linear regression model), focusing on the state of São Paulo, due to its central role 
as ethanol producer. The hypothesis is that high correlation of ethanol and gasoline in-
creased substitutability is marked. After estimating the model, 𝑅2 equals 95% and the 
explanatory variables are significant at 5%. The prices of ethanol and gasoline are found 
to be correlated. The 70% efficiency theory suggests that no changed occurred in con-
sumer behavior. Gasoline prices and climatic conditions affect ethanol price. An increase 
in national fleet of FFV results in greater cross-price elasticity of the fuels. 
A summary of literature review is presented in Tables 3.1-3.3 below.
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Table 3.1. Literature Review: Cointegration Analysis 
 
  
Author Alves and Bueno (2003) Rapsomanikis and Hallam (2006) Balcombe and Rapsomanikis (2008) 
Level Brazil Brazil Brazil 
Period 1974-1999 (annual) 2000-2006 (weekly) July 2000- May 2006 (weekly) 
Method 
Cointegration analysis (Engle-Granger), Unit 
Root 
Discrete two-regime cointegration approach (Jo-
hansen MLE),SIC, Unit root(ADF,PP,KPSS), 
Granger Causality, Test. VAR, Hansen and Seo 
(nonlinear) TVECM and Linear VECM 
Bayesian Monte-Carlo Markov Algorithm 
estimation, cointegration method. Linear 
model, Extension of VECM (Taylor ap-
proximation, asymmetric and threshold 
model) 
Variables 
Real GDP per capita, real gasoline price, per 
capita gasoline consumption(liters), real ethanol 
price 
Ethanol price, oil price, sugar price (price-pairs) Ethanol price, sugar price, oil price 
Empirical Results 
Levels 𝐼 (1) and cointegrated, Price and income 
inelasticity of gasoline demand, Higher gasoline 
price elasticity of demand in long run, Gasoline 
and ethanol imperfect substitutes 
Cointegration in price pairs, Ethanol-oil and 
sugar-oil nonlinear adjustment, Ethanol-sugar lin-
ear adjustment, Oil Granger causes ethanol-sugar, 
Direct causality from oil to sugar, Speed of ad-
justment depending on sign of disequilibria 
Nonlinear adjustment between oil-ethanol 
(threshold) and oil-sugar (asymmetric) 
prices, Linear adjustment of sugar-ethanol, 
Oil prices long-term determinants of sugar 
price, Sugar Granger-causes ethanol, Price 
transmission from oil to sugar to ethanol 
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Table 3.1(continued). Literature Review: Cointegration Analysis 
 
  
Author Ferreira, Prado and Silveira (2009) Boff (2011) Freitas and Kaneko (2011) 
Level Brazil Brazil (São Paulo & Rio de Janeiro) Brazil 
Period 
January 2002-December 2006 (monthly),  
1979-2004 (annual) 
July 2001- March 2010 (monthly) January 2003- July 2010 (monthly) 
Method 
Cointegration (Engle-Granger, Johansen), Unit 
root (ADF, Perron). Autoregressive Distribution 
Lag (ARDL), Partial Cointegration Model., Cau-
sality Wald Test 
Cointegration Analysis (Johansen and LR. Unit 
root (ADF, KPSS, UR-SB), AIC-SBIC- HQIC, 
Granger Causality test, Linear Model and VECM 
Cointegration Analysis- Autoregressive 
Distribution Lag (ARDL) 
Variables 
Flex, gasoline and alcohol cars, gasoline price, 
alcohol price, gasoline and alcohol technical ef-
ficiency 
Ethanol price, sugar price, gasoline price 
dummy(=1 for harvesting period of May- August) 
Fuel demand, fuel prices, consumer pur-
chasing capacity, fleet size 
Empirical Results 
Levels 𝐼(1), Cointegration of energy prices, 
Stronger causality from gasoline to ethanol, 
Steady speed of adjustment 
Levels 𝐼(1) with and without time trend, AR (1) 
with drift, Deviations from mean 𝐼(0), AR (2), 
Cointegration, Sugar and gasoline Granger-cause 
ethanol price, Ethanol/gasoline price ratio con-
verging to 70%. Ethanol price elasticity moving to 
1 
Symmetric ethanol and gasohol dynamics 
indicating increasing substitutability, Flex 
fuel technology the main driver of ethanol 
demand, Greater ethanol  long-run than 
short-run   elasticity and cross-price elas-
ticity indicating shorter purchasing deci-
sion time and higher substitutability 
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Table 3.1(continued). Literature Review: Cointegration Analysis 
 
  
Author Du and Carriquiry (2011) Silva, Vasconcelos, Vasconcelos, Mattos(2014) Chen and Shaghaian (2015) 
Level Brazil Brazil Brazil 
Period January 2005- October 2010 (monthly) May 2004- February 2012 (monthly) 2003-2014 (weekly) 
Method 
Hansen Threshold Cointegration Method, LM 
test, Partial Adjustment model 
Unit root(DF-GLS),Threshold error correction(TAR) 
and momentum threshold error correction model 
(MTAR) 
Unit root (Perron), Cointegration Analy-
sis with Structural Breaks (Johansen), 
Granger Causality Test, VAR, Extension 
of Linear VECM 
Variables 
Ethanol price, gasoline price, sugar price, etha-
nol exports, FFV shares 
Gasoline price (wholesale- retail) Ethanol price, sugar price, oil price 
Empirical Results 
Levels 𝐼(1), Exogeneity of gasoline prices caus-
ing market supply shocks, Existence of thresh-
old, Sugar price strongly influencing ethanol 
price, existence of autocorrelation in errors, In 
regime 1 (FFVs share in vehicle fleet does not 
exceed 30%), FFV shares and exports of ethanol 
not significant, which is not the case under re-
gime 2 
Asymmetry is regional problem rather than national, 
Cointegration between 103 cities between retail and 
wholesale prices in TAR model-96 in MTAR, In-
creased symmetry in northeastern region and in-
creased asymmetry in southern region, Positive cor-
relation with prices of distributors 
Levels 𝐼(1), No cointegration during 
2003-2008, High autocorrelation among 
variables, Sugar Granger-causes ethanol 
price, Cointegration during 2008-2014, 
Oil is weakly exogenous 
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Table 3.2. Literature Review: Panel Data Analysis 
 
  
Author Silva, Tiryaki and Pontes (2009) Santos (2013) Nuñez and Otero (2015) 
Level Brazil (all states) Brazil (all states) Brazil (all states) 
Period 2001-2006, 2003-2007(quarterly) July 2001- December 2010 (quarterly) July 2004-September2014 (Weekly Data) 
Method 
Panel data (Generalized Method of Moments-
SYS) 
Dynamic Panel Data Model ( Generalized 
Method of Moments- SYS) 
Time series-cross sectional analysis (Pairwise Pe-
saran Approach), Spatial Approach, Unit root 
(ADF, ADFmax), AIC 
Variables 
Gasoline sales, real gasoline price, real etha-
nol price, real GDP per capita, dummy varia-
bles 
Ethanol, gasoline, CNG real price and con-
sumption, GDP per capita, dummy for obedi-
ence or not of consumers to technological 
threshold 
Gasoline and ethanol price, population density, 
real GDP per capita, tax differential, number of 
gas stations, distance between states, dummy for 
whether differential refers to gasoline or ethanol 
Empirical Results 
Increased cross-price elasticity and price 
elasticity of demand, Gasoline demand be-
comes slightly more elastic, Income elasticity 
remains relatively stable 
Dynamics of fuel market in Brazil determined 
by ethanol, Elastic demand for ethanol, Inelas-
tic demand for gasoline and natural gas, Con-
sumer sensitivity has changed 
More than 50% price differentials I (0), Popula-
tion density, number of gas stations and GDP per 
capita statistically insignificant, Spatial effects 
important in analysis, Distance between states and 
tax system speed of adjustment determinants, 
Quicker speed of adjustment for price differen-
tials of one fuel, compared to price differentials of 
both fuels, Gasoline price differential quicker 
speed of adjustment 
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Table 3.2 (continued). Literature Review: Panel Data Analysis 
 
  
Author Moraes, Bacchi and Caldarelli (2016) Gilio and Moraes (2016) 
Level Brazil (southcentral region) Brazil (São Paulo municipalities) 
Period 2000-2008 (annual) 2005-2011 (annual) 
Method Generalized Method of Moments-SYS (spatial approach) Dynamic spatial panel- GMM-SYS. Wald test, Arellano-Bond, Sargan test 
Variables 
Mean real agricultural income, workforce use in agriculture(rate), 
sugarcane in area with temporary crops(proportional representation, 
agricultural crops in total Brazilian landmass (proportional represen-
tation), operation or not of a sugarcane processing facility in a given 
municipality, temporary crops for agriculture in area(proportional 
representation) 
Logarithmic transformation of: GDP per capita, illiteracy rate, urbanization 
rate, population density, area covered by sugarcane over total municipal area, 
dummy (presence of sugarcane plant), percentage of municipality total area 
Empirical Results 
Positive contribution of mass ethanol production to the GDP 
growth(southcentral Brazil), 10 year persistence of establishment of 
sugar mills and ethanol plants, positive contribution of mass ethanol 
production to the GDP growth(southcentral Brazil) 
Socioeconomic gains to municipality and neighboring in presence of sugar-
cane processing plant and benefits to related sector, Limited negative effect of 
extended cultivation of sugarcane, Urban areas in better socioeconomic posi-
tion 
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Table 3.3. Literature Review: Other Approaches 
Author Koizumi (2003) Salvo and Huse (2010) Santos and Colomer (2014) 
Level Brazil and 14 international ethanol markets Brazil Brazil (São Paulo) 
Period 1990-2003 (annual) July 2001- September 2009 (monthly) 2003-2012 (annual) 
Method Dynamic Partial Equilibrium model 
Unit root(Saikkonen-Lütkepohl), Cointegration 
analysis (Johansen), VAR,VECM 
OLS (Multiple Linear Regression Model) with 
gradual introduction of dependent variables 
Variables 
Ethanol and sugar market (production, con-
sumption, exports, imports, ending stock ac-
tivities), automobile data 
Gasoline and ethanol price at pump, interna-
tional sugar price, WTI, international sugar 
price, harvest share over GDP, new car sales, 
vehicles registered 
Gasoline and ethanol price, ethanol sales, climatic 
conditions, GDP 
Empirical Results 
Future contribution of maintenance of blend-
ing ratio towards expanding ethanol market 
enhanced Brazilian Government control over 
ethanol and sugar world priced 
Cross-sectional variation, Instantaneous causal-
ity between ethanol and gasoline prices and 
Granger Causality of gasoline over ethanol, eth-
anol-gasoline price ratio less volatile in last half 
of data, Distance among states important deter-
minant of ethanol prices 
Correlation between ethanol and gasoline prices, 
No change in consumer behavior according to 
70% efficiency theory, Gasoline price and climatic 
conditions as ethanol price determinants, Increase 
in fleet driving cross-price elasticity up 
37 
4 Modelling Strategy 
The methodology that has been followed is separated into two main parts. The first part 
consists of a time series pairwise approach, while in the second, tools from panel data 
analysis have been used in order to respond to the ethanol market structure of Brazil. 
Regarding the variables under consideration, let price of ethanol be denoted as price_eth-
anol and gasoline price as price_gasoline. Then, both variables are transformed in their 
natural logarithms that is log_price_ethanol and log_price_gasoline. The transformation 
of the variables in logarithmic form, permits for investigating the correlation among the 
variables by avoiding linear changes, which may affect the correlation among them. It 
contributes towards reducing the scale of data so that R2 and standard errors of coefficient 
estimates do not suffer any problems. Furthermore, it provides interpretation of the esti-
mated parameters in percentage terms as elasticities, which is crucial for the present study 
[13]. 
 
4.1 Time Series Analysis 
As pointed out in the Economic Approach, the economic relationship between ethanol 
and gasoline price in Brazil is rather perplexed since they are simultaneously substitutes 
and complements. Within the time series framework, the relationship between both vari-
ables is investigated using a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model that is the broadly used 
econometric model characterized by interdependency. The presentation of the model will 
be specified within Johansen Cointegration analysis. 
4.1.1 Unit Root Hypothesis 
Determining the series’ order of integration provides the framework of the empirical anal-
ysis to be followed. A series that is stationary has constant mean, variance and covariance, 
while lack of these attributes is a characteristic of non-stationarity. Conversion of the non-
stationary time-series into stationary is achieved by taking first differences. Then, the 
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series are perceived as integrated of order 𝑑 (𝐼(𝑑)), with 𝑑 representing the order of inte-
gration. The latter indicates the amount of unit roots present in a time series which is 
equivalent to the number of times the series has to be first differenced to become station-
ary. Non-stationarity is denoted as 𝐼(1), while stationarity as 𝐼(0). The majority of eco-
nomic and financial energy related time series are proven to be 𝐼(1) in literature. 
Applying OLS on non-stationary time series might provide spurious regressions, with 
inflated 𝑅2 and t-statistics and thus it is urgent to examine if there exists a long-run rela-
tionship between the 𝐼(1) variables. Cointegration analysis suggests initially testing for 
a unit root in the selected time series. However, this analysis is proceeded within the panel 
data analysis framework in the present dissertation. 
A theory supporting the chosen procedure indicates that Dickey Fuller (1979) and Phillips 
Perron (1988) tests are characterized by low power, mainly in modest samples when com-
puted in time series. Furthermore, possible structural breaks may affect the availability 
and use of data in the time series. To avoid this, a rather powerful type of the tests is 
provided in cases where time series and cross-sectional data is studied in combination 
[13]. Due to the enhancement of information in time series, with information in cross-
sectional part it is more possible to avoid type II error. Moreover, unlike traditional unit 
root tests for individual time series which follow rather complex distributions, panel unit 
root tests’ statistics follow normal distribution to the limit [45]. Thus, for the time being, 
the existence of a unit root in the time series, which is supported by past literature, remains 
as an initial hypothesis, and thus, both log_price_ethanol and log_price_gasoline are con-
sidered to be 𝐼(1). 
4.1.2 Lag-Length Selection - Information Criteria 
The high sensitivity of Johansen Cointegration test to the lag length selection [13], com-
bined with the fact that one of the drawbacks of VAR models is the determination of the 
optimal lag length of the model, highlight the importance of the present step. Since finan-
cial theory does not provide the tools to determine the period that will take for changes to 
the variables to correspond to the system, two main methods are used to eliminate that 
problem: cross-equation restrictions and information criteria. Due to limitations of the 
first method, information criteria have been applied in the present dissertation [13]. Un-
like cross-equation restrictions, information criteria do not embody assumptions of nor-
mal-error distributions, a case which is unlikely to exist within financial data. On the 
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contrary, information criteria compensate the reduction of the RSS (𝑙 𝑛(?̂?2)) caused by 
the addition of more lags, by imposing a penalty term, the value of which increases [13]. 
Literature suggests Akaike Information Criteria (AIC hereafter) (1973), Schwarz-Bayes-
ian Information Criteria (SIC hereafter) (1978) and Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria 
(HQIC) (1979).The present study has considered the first two information criteria and has 
based the empirical analysis on AIC output. The multivariate presentation of information 
criteria is as follows: 
Multivariate Akaike Information Criteria-MAIC 
𝑀𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔|?̂?| +
2𝑘′
𝛵
 (4.1.1) 
Multivariate Schwarz - Bayesian Information Criteria-MSBIC 
𝑀𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔|?̂?| +
𝑘′
𝛵
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇) (4.1.2) 
In both cases, ?̂? represents the variance-covariance residual matrix, 𝑘′ represents the 
number of regressors from all equations in total and 𝛵 represents the number of the equa-
tions. The latter equals 𝑝2𝑘 + 𝑝 in case the VAR system embodies 𝑝 equations, each of 
them with 𝑘 lags of the 𝑝 number of variables and a constant added in each equation. 
They account for 0,1, … , ?̅? lags. The number of lags that minimizes the information cri-
terion is considered as the optimal lag length.  
4.1.3 Cointegration Tests 
In case the time series are considered to be 𝐼(1) and the existence of cointegration is a 
possible scenario, three methodologies are mainly suggested towards justification of that 
hypothesis: Engle-Granger two step method (1987), Johansen (1991) and Engle-Yoo 
three step procedure (1987) methods [13]. In the present study, Johansen method has been 
implemented based on the fact that it is VAR based, unlike Engle-Granger that concen-
trates on stationarity testing of the regressed equation’s residuals. Furthermore, it does 
not require identical order of integration in the time series. Moreover, the fact that Johan-
sen embodies the hypothesis testing of existence of long-run equilibrium, unlike Engle 
Granger that does not permit hypothesis testing regarding the cointegrating relationships 
[8] justifies the use of the former in the present study. 
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Johansen Cointegration Test 
In order to proceed with Johansen testing, construction of a VAR model is essential: Con-
sider a set of 𝑔 𝐼(1) variables that are expected to be cointegrated. The VAR model would 
be: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑦𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑢𝑡   (4.1.3) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a 𝑔 × 1 vector of the price series at time 𝑡, 𝜇 represents the 𝑔 × 1 intercept 
vector, 𝛽 are the 𝑔 × 𝑔 matrices containing parameters of lagged prices to be estimated, 
𝑢𝑡 is the 𝑔 × 1 error vector and 𝑘 is the amount of lags of prices that have been determined 
by the information criteria. In the present study 𝑔=2, 𝑦1 is log_price_ethanol, 𝑦2 is 
log_price_gasoline and 𝑘 varies from 1 to 11 in each state as defined from AIC output. 
In case all the series are 𝐼(1), 𝑦𝑡−1 is subtracted from both left hand side (LHS) and right 
hand side (RHS), while after rearrangements the following model is obtained: 
 Δyt = μ + Πyt-k + Γ1Δyt-1 + Γ2Δyt-2 + ⋯ + ΓkΔyt-(k-1) + ut  (4.1.4), 
 
where 𝛱 = (∑ 𝛽𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1 − 𝐼𝑔 and 𝛤𝑖 = (∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1 ) − 𝐼𝑔. 
It embodies 𝑔 first differenced variables in LHS, while on the RHS 𝑘 − 1 lags of the first 
differenced dependent variables are included. Every lag is linked to a 𝛤 matrix of coeffi-
cients. From the fact that 𝑦𝑡 is an 𝐼(1) vector, 𝛥𝑦𝑡 should be an 𝐼(0) vector. Thus if there 
exists any cointegrating relationship, it should be embodied in 𝛱𝑦𝑡−𝑘 since it is the only 
term that could be 𝐼(1). 
Consequently, the central idea of Johansen Cointegration test of the dependent variables 
is examining the 𝛱 matrix rank that contains the long run coefficients through its eigen-
values 𝜆𝑖 (characteristic roots). The rank is defined by the number of non-zero eigenval-
ues. They are placed in increasing order 𝜆1 ≥ 𝜆2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝜆𝑔, being positive and lower 
than unity in absolute terms, with 𝜆1 being closer to unity and 𝜆𝑔 being closer to zero. In 
case of no cointegration, 𝜆𝑖 ≈ 0 ∀ 𝑖, so 𝛱 matrix rank will be not statistically different 
from zero. Although in that case the test runs on ln(1 − 𝜆𝑖) instead of λi, if 𝜆𝑖 equals to 
zero then also ln(1 − 𝜆𝑖) will equal to zero. 
In case that 𝛱 rank equals to 1, ln(1 − 𝜆𝑖) will equal to zero, while ln(1 − 𝜆1) will take 
negative value ∀ 𝑖 > 1. In case the eigenvalue 𝑖 differs from zero, ln(1 − 𝜆1) < 0 ∀ 𝑖 >
1. So the condition for 𝛱 rank to equal to 1 is the largest eigenvalue being statistically 
different from zero, while the other eigenvalues not being statistically different from zero 
[13]. 
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The suggested t-statistics are: 
𝜆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒(𝑟) =  −𝑇 ∑ ln (1 − ?̂?𝑖
𝑔
𝑖=𝑟+1 ) (4.1.5) 
𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟, 𝑟 + 1) =  −𝑇 ∑ ln (1 − ?̂?𝑟+1
𝑔
𝑖=𝑟+1 )(4.1.6). 
In these tests 𝑟 represents the amount of cointegrating vectors under the 𝐻0, while ?̂?𝑖 
stands for the 𝛱 matrix 𝑖𝑡ℎ ordered eigenvalue’s estimate. The greater the values 𝜆𝑖 takes, 
the more negative and greater values ln(1 − 𝜆𝑖) will take, so the t-statistic will have 
greater value as output. A cointegrating vector is attributed to each eigenvalue, which is 
significant in case the respective eigenvalue is significantly different from zero [13]. 
In the case of 𝜆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒, the 𝐻0 is that the cointegrating vectors are ≤ 𝑟, while the alternative 
indicates that they are > 𝑟. It initiates with 𝑝 number of eigenvalues, with the largest 
being removed successively. The statistic is equal to zero in case 𝜆𝑖 = 0 ∀ 𝑖.On the other 
hand, 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 tests each eigenvalue individually and embodies an 𝐻0 that cointegrating vec-
tors are = 𝑟, against the alternative that they are = 𝑟 + 1 [13].The tests follow non-stand-
ard distribution. Critical values are provided by Johansen and Jesulius (1990). They are 
based on 𝑔 − 𝑟, on the presence or not of constant in each equation and the amount of 
components that are 𝐼(1). 
In case the t-statistic is greater than the corresponding critical value, the H0 of existence 
of 𝑟 cointegrating vectors is rejected in favor of the H1 of each test as presented above. 
The null hypothesis under which the test is run on a sequence is that 𝑟 = 0,1, … , 𝑔 − 1 
and as a result the hypotheses for the 𝜆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 are as presented below:  
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 0 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑠 𝐻1: 0 < 𝑟 ≤ 𝑔 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 1 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑠 𝐻1: 1 < 𝑟 ≤ 𝑔 
                                                                ⋮ 
𝐻0: 𝑟 = 𝑔 − 1 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑠 𝐻1: 𝑟 = 𝑔 
In the 1𝑠𝑡 test, the 𝐻0 of no existence of cointegrating vectors is examined (rank=0). In 
case of no rejection of the null, one should conclude that no cointegrating vectors exist 
and the test will be finished. In case of rejection of the null, the 𝐻0 of existence of one 
cointegrating vector (𝐻0: 𝑟 = 1) will be examined. There is a successive increase in the 
𝑟, until the 𝐻0 is not rejected [13]. 
This procedure is linked to the 𝛱 rank, within the context that 𝑟 repsesents that specific 
rank. The case of 𝛱 being of full rank (𝑟 = 𝑔) is impossible, since that would indicate the 
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stationarity of 𝑦𝑡. In case rank of 𝛱 is equal to zero, then 𝛥𝑦𝑡 is dependent on 𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑗 but 
not on 𝛥𝑦𝑡−1, indicating the absence of cointegrating relationship among the components 
of 𝛥𝑦𝑡−1.  
The case of 1 < 𝑟(𝛱) < 𝑔 is indicative of 𝑟 cointegrating vectors. In case that existence 
of cointegrating relation is revealed, estimation of a VECM is the next step: 
𝛥𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛱𝑦𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛤1𝛥𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛤2𝛥𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝛤𝑘𝛥𝑦𝑡−(𝑘−1) + 𝑢𝑡 (4.1.7) 
where 𝛱 is given by: 𝛱 = 𝛼𝛽′ with respective dimension (𝑔 × 𝑟) and (𝑟 × 𝑔). In that, 𝛼 
represents the percentage of the disequilibrium error corrected in every period (speed of 
adjustment), while 𝛽 provides the cointegrating vectors (long-run relationship among the 
variables) and 𝛽′𝑦𝑡−𝑘 represents the disequilibrium error, that is the deviation of the price 
relationship for their long-run co-movement [13]. 
4.1.4 Impulse Responses 
An important drawback of VAR models, is that they are a-theoretical, while the great 
amount of parameters, constitute the interpretation of the estimated model a rather diffi-
cult task. The interconnection between the equations and the possible swift of sign of 
lagged variables’ coefficients through the lags, would make the effect of a change in a 
variable on future values of the other variables within the system, indiscernible. Towards 
partial solution of the issue, literature suggests the following statistics that are applied on 
the estimated VAR: block significance tests, variance decompositions and impulse re-
sponses [13]. Within the present study, impulse responses have been applied to the 
VECM model. 
Since VECM model has been estimated, the short-term dynamics can be investigated by 
applying the Impulse Response Functions (IRF). Impulse response functions examine the 
way the dependent variables respond to shocks (innovations) applied to the other varia-
bles in the system separately. Imposition of a unit shock on the error term, separately for 
every variable of each equation is followed by notation of the effects on the VECM sys-
tem. In a VECM system of 𝑔 variables, generation of 𝑔2 impulse responses is feasible. 
In order to achieve that, the VECM should be expressed in Moving Average Representa-
tion 𝑦𝑡 = ∑ 𝐵𝑖
∞
𝑖=0 𝑢𝑡, where the 𝐵𝑖 (𝑖 = 2, … , 𝑛) matrices are calculated recursively by 
the expression Bn = Φ1Bn-1 + Φ2Bn-2 + ⋯ + ΦkBn-g;  B0 = Ig;  Bn = 0, for n<0: 𝛷1 =
1 + 𝛱 + 𝛤1 and 𝛷𝑖 = 𝛤𝑖 − 𝛤𝑖−1 (𝑖 = 2, … , 𝑘) [33, 42]. According to Pesaran-Shin (1998) 
43 
the Generalized Impulse Response Functions of yi with respect to the error shock in the 
jth equation is given by: 
 𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹 (𝑦𝑛, 𝑦𝑗, ℎ) =
𝑢𝑖
′ 𝐵ℎ ∑ 𝑢𝑗
√𝜎𝑗𝑗
, ℎ = 0,1, … , 𝑛.  
The GIRF are unique and do not demand reordering of the system variables (orthogonali-
zation of the error shocks).Finally, in case the system is characterized by stability, the 
shock will progressively decay [13]. 
 
4.2 Panel Data Analysis 
Within panel data that combines time series analysis with cross-section information, the 
model can be described as: 
yi t  =  μi  +  β1i x1i,t +  ui,t (4.2.1), 
where, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, log_price_ethanol in the present study, 𝜇iis the in-
tercept, 𝛽 represents the 𝑘 × 1 vector of estimated parameters of the independent varia-
bles, while 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a 1 × 𝑘 vector of the independent variable, log_price_gasoline in the 
present study. Finally, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 and 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑘 represents the amount of slope 
parameters. The fact that the amount of observations for each time series in each cross 
section is the same, characterizes the model as balanced panel [13]. 
4.2.1 Panel Unit Root Tests 
As suggested earlier, panel unit root tests are more powerful than individual time-series 
unit root tests. Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC hereafter) (2002), Breitung (2000), and Hadri 
(2000) tests make an assumption of a unit root process that is common across the cross-
sections. In LLC and Breitung tests, the 𝐻0 is of a unit root, unlike Hadri test where the 
𝐻0 is of no unit root. On the other hand, Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS hereafter) (2003), 
Fisher-ADF and PP tests (Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001)), permit the existence 
of separate unit root processes which may be differentiated across the cross-sections 
These tests proceed to a combination of separate unit root tests towards derivation of a 
panel output [18]. Within the framework of the present study IPS and Fisher-ADF Unit 
Root tests have been computed. 
Im, Pesaran and Shin Unit Root Test 
Consider the equation 𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 (4.2.2), 
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where 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇; 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁. 
The model provides a generalization since it embodies both entity and time related effects 
via 𝑎𝑖 and 𝜃𝑡 and the embodiment of lags eliminates autocorrelation present in 𝛥𝑦. 
The null hypothesis is 𝐻0:  𝜌𝑖 = 0 ∀ 𝑖, suggesting non-stationarity in all panel time series 
while 𝐻1: 𝜌𝑖 < 0, where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁1 and 𝜌𝑖 = 0, where 𝑖 = 𝑁1 + 1,  𝑁1 + 2, … , 𝑁, 
suggesting that (𝑁1/𝑁) time series are stationary and the remaining ((𝑁 −  𝑁1)/𝑁) are 
non-stationary. 
No imposition of 𝜌 being identical exists. Each time series of the panel undergoes unit 
root tests separately so that an ADF t-statistic is provided for each and consequently a 
cross-sectional average is calculated. Then the average under the null of existence of unit 
root within the time series, is expressed as standard normal variate. They apply an LM-
test and a test that resembles t-tests. In case the series has adequately large dimension, 
individual unit root tests is applied on each series towards determining the proportion of 
the separate tests that have rejection as output and consequently the weight of proof 
against the joint 𝐻0 [13]. 
Fisher-ADF Unit Root Test 
Maddala-Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) proposed a differentiation of the IPS suggestion, 
based on Fisher’s (1932) output. They suggest the combination of p-values from unit root 
tests that are individual. Within that framework, each series of the panel undergoes unit 
root test individually, and the p-value output is combined. Consider that the p-values are 
indicated as 𝑝𝜐𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁. If considering the 𝐻0 of a unit root in each of the series, 
then every 𝑝𝜐𝑖  will follow uniform distribution for the [0, 1] interval, and N will be con-
sidered as given as 𝑇 → ∞, for the following equation to hold: 
𝜆 = −2 ∑ ln(𝑝𝜐𝑖) ~𝜒2𝛮
2𝛮
𝑖=1  (4.2.3). 
The test provides freedom in that the amount of observations can be differentiated, due 
to the regressions being run individually for every time series, and the combination occurs 
only considering the p-values for the t-statistic. Independence of the cross-sections is im-
portant for a 𝜒2 distribution to be followed by the sum. Due to the non-standard nature of 
the ADF t-statistic, Monte- Carlo simulation provides the p-values, and since the chosen 
lag-length varies among the cross-sections, a single Monte-Carlo is required for each se-
ries. A differentiated version of the test is suggested by Choi (2001), following an asymp-
totic standard normal distribution, again based on the p-values [13]. Finally, the 𝜌𝑖 is 
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allowed to change across the cross-sections (pooling the ?̂?𝑖𝑡s along the between dimen-
sion [45]. 
4.2.2 Panel Cointegration Tests 
Cointegration testing within the panel framework could be characterized by complexity, 
since cointegration could occur both within each cross-section and among the groups of 
the variables (cross-sectional cointegration) [13]. 
Two approaches of panel cointegration tests exist: 1) maximum likelihood based and 2) 
residual based. Groen and Kleibergen (1999), Larsson and Lyhagen (1999) and Larsson, 
Lyhagenand and Lothgren (2001) suggest the former, unlike McCoskey and Kao (1998), 
Kao (1999), Pedroni (1995, 1997, 1999) that suggest the latter [30]. The present study 
focuses on the latter category. 
Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test 
While the majority of panel cointegration tests were a generalization of Engle-Granger 
univariate methods, Pedroni introduced a rather innovative work. In the case where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 
and 𝑥𝑚,𝑖𝑡 are both 𝐼(1) and cointegration is considered as a possible scenario, 
𝑦𝑖 𝑡  =  𝜇𝑖  +  𝛽1𝑖 𝑥1𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖,𝑡 (4.2.4) 
where 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 and represent the observation number over time (𝛵 = 12 × 13 =
156);𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 which refer to the number of cross-sections(𝑁 = 27 in present study). 
Different intercepts 𝜇𝑖 are permitted, providing a generalization. 
The presence of a unit root in all the regression’s residuals (?̂?𝑖,𝑡) is then tested by a 
Dickey-Fuller or Augmented Dickey-Fuller: 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑖,𝑗𝛥𝑢𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1  (4.2.5) 
The 𝐻0 for both within-dimension and between-dimension based cases is 𝐻0: 𝛾𝑖 = 1 ∀ 𝑖 
indicating the presence of a unit root on the residuals so that no cointegration exists. Re-
garding the alternative hypothesis, in the first case H1: γi = γ < 1 ∀ i indicating that the 
autoregressive dynamics follow identical stationary process, while in the between-dimen-
sion based case H1: γi < 1 ∀ i indicating that the autoregressive dynamics follow a vary-
ing stationary process. 
Subsequently, he uses seven types of t-statistics based on the usual t-ratio towards esti-
mation of the residuals. The first four are within-dimension statistics: 1. Panel 𝜐-statistics: 
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(non-parametric variance ratio stat), 2. Panel 𝜌-statistics (non-parametric panel type sta-
tistic equivalent to Phillips Perron rho-stat), 3. Panel t-statistics (non-parametric equiva-
lent to Phillips Perron t-stat) and 4. Panel t-statistics (parametric panel cointegration sta-
tistics equivalent to ADF 𝑡-statistics). These are followed by three between-dimension 
statistics (group mean approach): 1. Group 𝜌-statistics (equivalent to Phillips Perron rho-
stat.), 2. Group t-statistics (non-parametric equivalent to Phillips Perron t-stat.) and 3. 
Group t-statistics (parametric equivalent to ADF t-statistics) [40]. 
These tests are standardized in terms of the inclusion or not of an intercept. Further-
more, they follow asymptotical standard normal distribution [13]. They examine Η0 of 
no cointegration among the cross sections against H1 of cointegration. In contradiction 
to the group statistics where the 1𝑠𝑡 order autoregressive term varies among the cross 
sections, in panel statistics it remains unchanged. In the case of panel statistics, rejection 
of the null hypothesis indicate that ethanol price and gasoline price are cointegrated in 
all states (cross sections). On the other hand, in the case of group statistics, rejection of 
the null hypothesis indicates cointegrating relations among ethanol and gasoline price at 
least at one state [40]. 
Kao Residual Panel Cointegration Test 
Kao’s (1999) approach is a restricted type of Pedroni’s work, that allows for varying 
intercepts in (4.2.4), while the slope coefficients are unchanged through the groups. 
Subsequently, with the assumption of a homogeneous 𝜌, a pooled sample undergoes two 
tests: DF or ADF regression under the 𝐻0 of no cointegration, providing simplicity to the 
procedure [13]. 
4.2.3 Pool Panel Analysis 
Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) 
With the establishment of the existence of a linear combination that provides a long run 
relationship between the pooled data, generation of an individual cointegrating relation-
ship including a combination of 𝐼(1) attempted. Since the OLS estimate is characterized 
by bias and inconsistency within the panel cointegration analysis framework, use of the 
pool panel fully modified OLS estimator (FMOLS) is applied, which has been suggested 
by Phillips and Hansen (1991). It is preferred to Engle-Granger methods in that the 
FMOLS estimator overcomes the inference problem providing validity to the 𝛽 estimated 
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output even in limited samples and controls for probable regressors’ endogeneity and se-
rial correlation [8]. Phillips and Moon (1999), Kao and Chiang (2000) as well as, Pedroni 
(2000) have extended the Phillips and Hansen (1991) FMOLS method to panel level [18]. 
The pooled method that has been applied within this dissertation has been suggested by 
the former. The FMOLS method uses Kernal estimators of Nuisance parameters which 
have an effect on the OLS estimator’s asymptotic distribution. Towards ensuring asymp-
totic efficiency, modification of least squares to consider serial correlation outcomes and 
checking for endogeneity within the regressors that is consequence of the presence of co-
integrating relationships. 
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5 Data- Empirical Analysis 
The database used in the current dissertation comprises of average consumer prices for 
hydrous ethanol (etanol hidratado) and gasoline c (gasolina común). Prices are gathered 
regarding all 27 Brazilian States, ranging from January 2002 to December 2015 on 
monthly basis, forming 9072 time observations in total. Time series is expressed in nom-
inal Real (R$-the Brazilian currency) per liter. The source is Agência Nacional do Petró-
leo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis [4] that publishes both time series on aggregate, state 
and municipal level, both on weekly and monthly basis gathered from fuel stations. Con-
cerning ethanol, two time series are available: hydrous and anhydrous ethanol, both hav-
ing application as fuel. The difference among those two time series is negligible and char-
acterized by stability. The ethanol market structure of Brazil suggests that the two time 
series are considered for each of the 27 states of Brazil, mentioned in Regional Approach 
to consider the discrepancies among each state. The time series have been transformed 
into logarithmic form (log_price_ethanol and log_price_gasoline), resulting in the esti-
mated coefficients being interpreted as elasticities. All estimations and output are com-
puted in EViews 9.0. The graph of the two variables is provided in Appendix in Figures 
A.1.a-A.1.aa. 
5.1 Time Series Analysis 
Concerning time series analysis, the dataset consists of ethanol and gasoline prices in the 
27 states of Brazil, at time t, that is 54(= 27 × 2) price series and 168(= 14 × 12) 
monthly periods. At this stage, potential cointegration between the two price series in 
each state separately is investigated. 
5.1.1 Lag-Length Selection- Information Criteria 
The sensitivity of Johansen test, regarding the lag length that has been employed within 
the VECM, involves initially determining the optimal lag length in the equation of each 
state. Both AIC and SIC Information Criteria have been computed. The whole analysis, 
however, has been based on the AIC results. Table 5.1 provides the AIC lag order selec-
tion criteria, while the output based on SIC is provided in Appendix in Table A.1. 
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Table 5.1. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria: Akaike Information Criterion 
 
Table 5.1 (continued). VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria: Akaike Information Criterion 
 
 
 
Lag Acre Alagoas Amapa Amazonas Bahia Ceará 
Distrito 
Federal 
Espírito 
Santo 
0 -4.353574 -3.333116 -4.080418 -3.528944 -3.613139 -3.686519 -3.471856 -3.533926 
1 -10.52153 -9.871207 -8.980034 -8.73261 -9.074581 -9.02978 -8.214312 -8.926335 
2  -10.65067* -10.2406  -9.190170* -8.961544 -9.155697 -9.131092  -8.285207* -9.119284 
3 -10.64431 -10.26417 -9.160381 -8.914987 -9.131137 -9.102554 -8.258419 -9.095238 
4 -10.63546 -10.31108 -9.12384 -8.979395  -9.330503* -9.194648 -8.260634 -9.203327 
5 -10.60045 -10.35376 -9.146289 -8.948623 -9.313496 -9.207119 -8.239157 -9.235815 
6 -10.56813 -10.31522 -9.130888 -8.964605 -9.272629 -9.183775 -8.244229 -9.205463 
7 -10.55291 -10.29852 -9.102373 -8.93831 -9.276823 -9.185513 -8.200478 -9.202292 
8 -10.51724 -10.28075 -9.080524 -8.89386 -9.257526 -9.137387 -8.238857 -9.219581 
9 -10.51712 -10.28996 -9.072985  -8.984066* -9.259573 -9.182738 -8.195108 -9.22413 
10 -10.50868 -10.36951 -9.061483 -8.935562 -9.262756 -9.151421 -8.221705 -9.230992 
11 -10.52355 -10.39305 -9.056134 -8.898201 -9.269926 -9.207443 -8.173062  -9.269668* 
12 -10.51972  -10.40206* -9.055275 -8.881786 -9.243812  -9.216517* -8.126505 -9.254553 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
Lag Goiás Maranhão 
Mato 
Grosso 
Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Minas Ge-
rais 
Pará Paraíba Paraná 
0 -3.231814 -3.372747 -3.333915 -3.855069 -3.657119 -4.510933 -3.890467 -3.317899 
1 -8.097103 -9.625005 -8.538391 -9.094827 -9.503144 -10.44032 -9.712588 -8.154003 
2 -8.326455 -10.02796 -8.727932 -9.251571 -9.679179 -10.61421 -10.06138 -8.227852 
3 -8.330437 -10.01389  -8.738679* -9.22665 -9.669396 -10.60646 -10.05179 -8.207192 
4 -8.391933 -10.08718 -8.72337 -9.297708 -9.825211*  -10.73271* -10.1677  -8.282931* 
5 -8.417981 -10.06723 -8.734138 -9.306719 -9.821494 -10.72982  -10.21791* -8.279794 
6 -8.436538 -10.06675 -8.684271 -9.300529 -9.816317 -10.69876 -10.19728 -8.280403 
7  -8.458648* -10.04389 -8.710222  -9.314525* -9.77761 -10.65765 -10.17297 -8.243965 
8 -8.436052 -10.00396 -8.701682 -9.274419 -9.741308 -10.62608 -10.14451 -8.257092 
9 -8.402667 -10.00994 -8.661441 -9.246725 -9.706365 -10.58798 -10.16246 -8.218281 
10 -8.42564 -10.04003 -8.644597 -9.21477 -9.685281 -10.6056 -10.14831 -8.225423 
11 -8.405612  -10.09402* -8.626691 -9.225092 -9.658499 -10.63594 -10.15038 -8.199612 
12 -8.386333 -10.07873 -8.601603 -9.199246 -9.662079 -10.71057 -10.10405 -8.200181 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
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Table 5.1 (continued). VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria: Akaike Information Criterion 
 
Table 5.1 (continued).VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria: Akaike Information Criterion 
 
The output indicates that the optimal lag length varies across the states within a range of 
11 to 1 lags depending on the state. The chosen lag-length 𝑘 used in cointegration analysis 
is the chosen lag-length minus 1 due to the fact that the Johansen Cointegration analysis 
is based on first differences. 
Lag Pernambuco Piauí 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
Rio Grande 
do Norte 
Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Rondônia Roraima 
Santa 
 Catarina 
0 -3.312643 -4.035346 -3.723855 -3.322005 -3.630719 -4.226333 -3.483011 -3.733062 
1 -9.277346 -9.32556 -9.778357 -9.273627 -8.491897 -10.30284 -9.160093 -9.264883 
2 -9.64569 -9.576656 -10.15582 -9.575673 -8.630497 -10.53052 -9.392652 -9.429506 
3 -9.61108 -9.569178 -10.12453 -9.572115 -8.610538 -10.50803 -9.441974 -9.409048 
4 -9.650373 -9.672031 -10.24382 -9.695799  -8.635522*  -10.66797*  -9.555275* -9.451128 
5 -9.655902  -9.675054*  -10.28644*  -9.723321* -8.613511 -10.65714 -9.514583  -9.491848* 
6  -9.682959* -9.646669 -10.2479 -9.695107 -8.571247 -10.623 -9.532177 -9.466082 
7 -9.64607 -9.616677 -10.22731 -9.681914 -8.561214 -10.59726 -9.505549 -9.459298 
8 -9.647264 -9.590283 -10.20832 -9.657638 -8.530068 -10.55675 -9.509021 -9.42678 
9 -9.635773 -9.587129 -10.16736 -9.623328 -8.490356 -10.54908 -9.531254 -9.41306 
10 -9.614181 -9.589954 -10.16247 -9.636823 -8.49519 -10.58687 -9.492899 -9.37471 
11 -9.658458 -9.584778 -10.15805 -9.708742 -8.489374 -10.59784 -9.49583 -9.375536 
12 -9.633579 -9.567868 -10.1721 -9.67644 -8.479196 -10.56611 -9.490279 -9.327714 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
Lag São Paulo Sergipe Tocantins 
0 -2.882302 -3.842652 -3.765313 
1 -8.570917 -10.23420 -9.70156 
2 -8.823668 -10.45480 -10.1315 
3 -8.806089 -10.43599 -10.13331 
4 -8.859805  -10.65496* -10.20609 
5  -8.869328* -10.62949  -10.22881* 
6 -8.839085 -10.58518 -10.21926 
7 -8.810012 -10.58053 -10.1794 
8 -8.832917 -10.54453 -10.13882 
9 -8.788478 -10.55500 -10.10295 
10 -8.84238 -10.53944 -10.0923 
11 -8.843216 -10.52752 -10.08448 
12 -8.833977 -3.842652 -10.12144 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
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5.1.2 Johansen Cointegration Test 
Following the initial hypothesis that both variables are 𝐼(1), determination of whether 
there exists at least one stable linear combination 𝐼(0) of log_price_ethanol and 
log_price_gasoline and that non spurious relationship exists among the variables is per-
formed using Johansen Cointegration test. The trend assumption is that the level data 
present linear trends but the cointegrating equations have only intercepts. Tables 5.2 and 
5.4 depict the computed output regarding both Trace and Max Eigenvalue test statistics. 
The signs “*”, “**” and “***” when present next to the state suggest cointegration at 5%, 
10% and both significance levels respectively, while absence of the signs indicates ab-
sence of cointegration. P-values are reported within the brackets. 
 
Table 5.2. Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Trace 
 
Table 5.2 (continued) Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Trace 
 
Table 5.2 (continued). Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Trace 
 
𝐻0: Acre Alagoas Amapa Amazonas Bahia** Ceará 
Distrito 
Federal 
r=0 
21.53332 3.130717 29.77418 11.58693 15.24441 4.791621 44.09417 
[0.0054] [0.9607] [0.0002] [0.2596] [0.0545] [0.8306] [0.0000] 
r≤1 
5.824213 0.516233 8.190802 2.255165 1.782515 7.31E-05 6.412681 
[0.0158] [0.4725] [0.0042] [0.1332] [0.1818] [0.9943] [0.0113] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
𝐻0: 
Espírito 
Santo 
Goiás* Maranhão 
Mato 
 Grosso 
Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Minas 
Gerais*** 
Pará*** 
r=0 
5.536906 20.54718 8.732641 27.24233 12.64922 27.84801 18.06159 
[0.7495] [0.0079] [0.3907] [0.0006] [0.1283] [0.0004] [0.0201] 
r≤1 
0.011012 3.363046 0.169402 8.676676 4.8719375 0.479604 0.381322 
[0.9162] [0.0667] [0.6806] [0.0032] [0.0273] [0.4886] [0.5369] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
𝐻0: Paraíba Paraná*** Pernambuco Piauí 
Rio de 
Janeiro*** 
Rio 
Grande 
do Norte 
Rio Grande 
do Sul* 
r=0 
12.16714 26.74459 9.980666 9.677973 20.11079 11.90112 20.46542 
[0.1491] [0.0007] [0.2822] [0.3063] [0.0094] [0.1617] [0.0082] 
r≤1 
1.930252 1.177022 1.360812 3.009334 1.412308 2.252897 3.061985 
[0.1647] [0.2780] [0.2434] [0.0828] [0.2347] [0.1334] [0.0801] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
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Table 5.2 (continued) Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Trace 
 
The Trace statistics suggest a cointegration rank of one for 10 out of 27 states at 5% level 
of significance and 10 states at 10% level of significance as depicted in Table 5.2. The 
percentage of cointegration among the variables is identical and equal to 37% of the states 
for both significance levels as presented in Table 5.3 below: 
 
Table 5.3. Cointegrating Equations (%) - Trace 
 
The computed output regarding Maximum Eigenvalue statistics is presented in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Maximum Eigenvalue 
 
Table 5.4 (continued). Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Maximum Eigenvalue 
 
𝐻0: Rondônia*** Roraima** 
Santa  
Catarina 
São 
Paulo*** 
Sergipe*** Tocantins*** 
r=0 
21.84513 14.26393 12.01877 27.24233 16.44793 17.69176 
[0.0048] [0.0760] [0.1560] [0.0380] [0.0358] [0.0230] 
r≤1 
1.017422 1.858449 1.890788 0.713857 2.385419 2.649228 
[0.3131] [0.1728] [0.1691] [0.3982] [0.1225] [0.1036] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
α 5% 10% 
r=1 37% (10 of 27) 37%(10 of 27) 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
H0: Acre Alagoas Amapa Amazonas Bahia** Ceará 
Distrito 
Federal 
r=0 
15.70911 2.614484 21.58338 9.331763 13.46190 4.791621 37.68149 
[0.0294] [0.9690] [0.0029] [0.2596] [0.0667] [0.7679] [0.0000] 
r≤1 
5.824213 0.516233 8.190802 2.255165 1.782515 7.31E-05 6.412681 
[0.0158] [0.4725] [0.0042] [0.1332] [0.1818] [0.9943] [0.0113] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
H0: 
Espírito 
Santo 
Goiás* Maranhão 
Mato 
 Grosso 
Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Minas 
Gerais*** 
Pará*** 
r=0 
5.525894 17.18414 8.563239 18.56565 7.777283 27.36841 17.68027 
[0.6745] [0.0168] [0.3243] [0.0098] [0.4018] [0.0003] [0.0139] 
r≤1 
0.011012 3.363046 0.169402 8.676676 4.871937 0.479604 0.381322 
[0.9162] [0.0667] [0.6806] [0.0032] [0.0273] [0.4886] [0.5369] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
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Table 5.4 (continued). Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Maximum Eigenvalue 
 
Table 5.4 (continued). Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Maximum Eigenvalue 
 
The Max-eigenvalue statistic suggests a cointegration rank of one for 9 out of 27 states at 
5% level of significance and 10 states at 10% level of significance. Thus, the percentage 
of cointegrated states for both t significance levels is presented in Table 5.5 below: 
 
Table 5.5. Cointegrating Equations (%) - Maximum Eigenvalue 
 
Comparing with past literature that has considered regional approach, the cointegration 
output is higher that Salvo and Huse output that suggests the existence of cointegration 
in 4 out of 27 states. It also justifies the results of Boff (2010) that has proven cointegra-
tion in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
Furthermore, Johansen Cointegration tests have also been applied regarding a trend as-
sumption that the level data and the cointegrating equations both have linear trends. In 
that case, the Trace statistic suggests a cointegration rank of one for 13 out of 27 states at 
both 5% and 14 of 27 states at 10% level of significance reaching a 48% and 52% of total 
states respectively, as depicted in Tables A.2 and A.4 in Appendix. The Max-Eigenvalue 
statistic suggests a cointegration rank of one for 12 out of 27 states at 5% and 11 out of 
H0: 
Paraíba Paraná*** 
Pernam-
buco 
Piauí 
Rio de 
Janeiro*** 
Rio 
Grande do 
Norte 
Rio Grande 
do Sul* 
r=0 10.23689 25.56757 8.619854 6.668638 18.69848 9.648220 17.40344 
[0.1968] [0.0006] [0.3192] [0.5290] [0.0093] [0.2361] [0.0154] 
r≤1 1.930252 1.177022 1.360812 3.009334 1.412308 2.252897 3.061985 
[0.1647] [0.2780] [0.2434] [0.0828] [0.2347] [0.1334] [0.0801] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
H0: 
Rondônia*** Roraima** 
Santa  
Catarina 
São 
Paulo*** 
Sergipe** 
Tocantins 
*** 
r=0 20.82771 12.40549 10.12798 15.56775 14.06251 15.04254 
[0.0040] [0.0963] [0.2037] [0.0309] [0.0538] [0.0376] 
r≤1 1.017422 1.858449 1.890788 0.713857 2.385419 2.649228 
[0.3131] [0.1728] [0.1691] [0.3982] [0.1225] [0.1036] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
α 5% 10% 
r=1 33% (9 of 27) 37%(10 of 27) 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend. MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values.  
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27 states at 10% level of significance, providing a percentage of 44% and 41% of total 
states as presented in Tables A.3 and A.5 in Appendix. The results are regarded as better 
for that model. However VECM model provided irrational values for long-run elasticities 
resulting in the rejection of the trend assumption. 
5.1.3 VECM - Long-Run Elasticity 
Johansen Cointegration test is in favor of existence of long-run relationship between eth-
anol and gasoline price in Goiás and Rio Grande do Sul at 5%, in Bahia and Roraima at 
10% and in Minas Gerais, Pará, Paraná, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Rondônia, Sergipe 
and Tocantins at both 5 and 10%. So, long-run elasticities are estimated through a VECM 
and provided for the cointegrated states in Table 5.6 below (std. errors are presented in 
parentheses): 
Table 5.6. VECM - Long-Run Elasticity 
 
Table 5.6 (continued). VECM - Long-Run Elasticity 
Table 5.6 (continued). VECM - Long-Run Elasticity 
 
Table 5.6 (continued). VECM - Long-Run Elasticity 
 
Acre Alagoas Amapa Amazonas Bahia** Ceará 
Distrito Fed-
eral 
- - - - 1.184292 - - 
- - - - (0.12647) - - 
Note: ‘-’ implies no cointegration. 
Espírito  
Santo 
Goiás* Maranhão 
Mato  
Grosso 
Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Minas  
Gerais*** 
Pará*** 
- 1.233660 - - - 1.169730 1.094118 
- (0.08673) - - - (0.06726) (0.09213) 
Note: ‘-’ implies no cointegration. 
 
 
Paraíba Paraná*** 
Pernam-
buco 
Piauí 
Rio de 
Janeiro*** 
Rio Grande 
do Norte 
Rio Grande do 
Sul* 
- 1.477367 - - 1.480865 - 1.602138 
- (0.09673) - - (0.07479) - (0.15083) 
Note: ‘-’ implies no cointegration. 
Rondônia*** Roraima** 
Santa 
 Catarina 
São Paulo*** Sergipe*** Tocantins*** 
1.076229 1.183203 - 1.664708 1.311895 1.433744 
(0.07793) (0.10009) - (0.15940) (0.09609) (0.12215) 
Note: ‘-’implies no cointegration. 
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The output suggests that a ceteris paribus 1% increase in gasoline price, will cause an 
increase of 1.07% in Rondônia, 1.09% in Pará, 1.17% in Minas Gerais, 1.18% in Roraima, 
1.23% in Bahia, 1.31% in Sergipe, 1.43% in Tocantins, 1.48% in Paraná and in Rio de 
Janeiro, 1.6% in Rio Grande do Sul and 1.66% in São Paulo and in the long-run. The 
long-run average elasticity is equal to 1.33% and lower than 1.8% and 1.96% aggregate 
estimate provided by Freitas and Kaneko (2011) and Boff (2010) respectively. However 
its high value reveals tight linkage among the two prices. It should be noted that all long 
run coefficients are statistically different from zero at 5% significance level.  
5.1.4 VECM - Speed of Adjustment 
Furthermore, speed of adjustment is provided in Table 5.7 below: 
 
Table 5.7. VECM - Speed of Adjustment 
 
Table 5.7 (continued). VECM - Speed of Adjustment 
 
The significant (since p-value is less than at least 0.05) negative coefficient in all cases 
suggests that there is long-run causality running from log_price_gasoline to 
log_price_ethanol and that the system returns to the long run equilibrium. More specifi-
cally, there is a disequilibrium in short run that is equal to 8% in Tocantins, 11% in Bahia, 
Roraima and in Sergipe, 12% in Rondônia, 15% in Pará and in Rio Grande do Sul, 16% 
in Rio de Janeiro and in São Paulo, 22% in Goiás, 27% in Minas Gerais and 28% in 
Bahia Goiás 
Minas 
Gerais 
Pará Paraná 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
-0.106641 -0.222871 -0.268462 -0.152285 -0.276309 -0.163364 
[0.0099] [0.0052] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0025] 
Note: P-values are provided in brackets. 
Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Rondônia Roraima São Paulo Sergipe Tocantins 
-0.152833 -0.119573 -0.108816 -0.163674 -0.112941 -0.077952 
[0.0012] [0.0005] [0.0065] [0.0013] [0.0016] [0.0293] 
Note: P-values are provided in brackets. 
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Paraná that will be corrected in the long run. These values are lower than 42.9% provided 
by Chen and Shaghaian (2015) and 0.52% by Ferreira, Prado and Silveira (2009). 
5.1.5 Impulse Responses 
In the present section, one standard deviation shock (innovation) is imposed to one vari-
able of the system in an artificial manner, and then the response of the other variable is 
measured within the system to represent the way the one standard deviation shock would 
persist in future periods. Initially, Figures 5.1.a-5.1.l represent the response of 
log_price_gasoline to a one standard deviation shock to log_price_ethanol for each state 
that cointegration exists among the two price series at 5 and 10%.Subsequently, Figures 
5.2.a-5.2.l represent the response of log_price_ethanol to a one standard deviation shock 
to log_price_gasoline for each state that cointegration exists among the two price series 
at 5 and 10%.The solid line in figures represents the responses of one variable to a shock 
in the other variable. The forecasting horizon of impulse responses is 12 months, denoted 
in the horizontal axis. Since the sample ranges until December of 2015, the 12 month 
period refers to 2016, so a pseudo-forecasting is applied. 
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Figures 5.1.a-5.1.l. Generalized Impulse Responses of log_price_gasoline to innovations in log_price_ethanol 
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Figure 5.2.a-5.2.l. Generalized Impulse Responses of log_price_ethanol to innovations in log_price_gasoline 
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Results indicate that a shock in log_price_ethanol has a low extent positive impact on 
log_price_gasoline in all states for all 12 periods as expected. More specifically, an initial 
positive response peaks at February regarding the state of Bahia and at March regarding 
Minas Gerais, Pará, Rio Grande do Sul, Rondônia and Sergipe and then there’s a level-
ling-off process within the 12 month horizon. The peak shows persistence from February 
to April regarding Goiás and from March to April regarding Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo 
and again gradually fades away in both cases. In the case of Roraima there is a peak at 
March but until December it seems to reoccur. Moreover, a slightly higher peak occurs 
in states of Paraná that persists from February to May. Finally, in the case of Tocantins 
from April until December there is a steady positive response of high magnitude indicat-
ing a shock in ethanol price, which signifies high elasticity. 
Regarding Figures 5.2.a-5.2.k, results again indicate a positive response of log_price_eth-
anol to a one standard deviation shock in log_price_gasoline that is greater in magnitude 
in comparison with the reverse case described above. That may be attributed to the rela-
tive size of both markets with gasoline market being rather international, unlike ethanol 
market that is rather local, highlighting the greater influence of the former on the latter. 
To begin with, regarding Paraná, a low peak occurs at March and gradually fades away, 
while in Tocantins there is a steady increasing response that seems to become steady and 
peaking from October to December indicating again a shock in ethanol price. A slightly 
higher response peaks on February regarding Minas Gerais and on May in Pará and de-
cays in both cases. Furthermore, even higher responses peak on February in Goias, and 
on May in Roraima and Rio de Janeiro, which are followed by a levelling-off process. In 
Rio Grande do Sul the peak persists from May to December, while in Rondônia from 
April to August and in Bahia from May to June and then decays in both latter cases. In 
Sergipe the shock persists from May until December, followed by an indication of a fad-
ing away process. Moreover, in São Paulo there is a relatively steady response with a 
slight peak during April-May. Finally, the peak occurs in February in Goiás being the 
highest from all states and gradually fades away. 
Since there is no related past literature, the results cannot be compared. 
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5.2 Panel Data Analysis 
In panel data analysis a monthly state-level panel regarding gasoline and ethanol prices 
at the pump significantly extends the sample as it is performed on 4536(= 12 × 14 ×
27) observations for each price series, resulting in a sample of 9072 = (4536 × 2) ob-
servations compared to 168 in the time series analysis. 
5.2.1 Unit Root Tests 
Within the framework of the present study, Im, Pesaran and Shin and ADF Fisher unit 
root tests are performed, to examine the case that each of the cross-sections’ price series 
in logarithmic form contains a unit root, allowing for varying values of ρ. The same 
tests are applied on the first differenced variables (d(log_price_ethanol)) and 
d(log_price_gasoline)) to ensure that they are 𝐼(0). The maximum lag length is set to 
11, taking into consideration the lag length criteria adopted in time series analysis. The 
lag length chosen for each state is based on AIC and the trend specification remains the 
same. Results are presented in Tables 5.8-5.15 below: 
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Table 5.8. IPS Unit Root Test: Individual effects of Ethanol Price (Levels) 
 
The p-values being less than at least 5% for each of the 27 cross-sections, indicate that 
the presence of a unit root in log_price_ethanol time series cannot be rejected in all 
cross-sections for at least at 5% level of significance, which means that they are non-
stationary in level form justifying the initial hypothesis. IPS W-stat indicates that the 
null of a unit root cannot be rejected marginally. 
Method Statistic P-value 
IPS W-stat -1.73546 0.0413 
Intermediate ADF Test Results on Ethanol Price 
State P-value Lag Max Lag Obs. 
Acre 0.4089 1 11 166 
Alagoas 0.3550 8 11 159 
Amapá 0.1941 1 11 166 
Amazonas 0.5862 5 11 162 
Bahia 0.4378 7 11 160 
Ceará 0.9536 10 11 157 
Distrito Federal 0.3330 7 11 160 
Espírito Santo 0.4523 8 11 159 
Goiás 0.2568 6 11 161 
Maranhão 0.5626 6 11 161 
Mato Grosso 0.2145 7 11 160 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.0966 7 11 160 
Minas Gerais 0.1141 7 11 160 
Pará 0.2154 6 11 161 
Paraíba 0.4526 6 11 161 
Paraná 0.3351 7 11 160 
Pernambuco 0.4518 5 11 162 
Piauí 0.2850 8 11 159 
Rio de Janeiro 0.3945 7 11 160 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.3255 9 11 158 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.3602 6 11 161 
Rondônia 0.4485 6 11 161 
Roraima 0.6010 7 11 160 
Santa Catarina 0.4934 8 11 159 
São Paulo 0.5485 7 11 160 
Sergipe 0.1969 8 11 159 
Tocantins 0.5676 6 11 161 
Note: Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process). P-values are computed assuming as-
ymptotic normality. Automatic lag length selection based on AIC: 0 to 10.  
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Table 5.9. IPS Unit Root Test: Individual effects of Ethanol Price (1ST Diff.) 
 
When applied in differences, the tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root form at least 
at 5% significance level as presented in Table 5.9. Thus d(log_price_ethanol) is 𝐼(0) in 
each state. 
 
Method Statistic P-value 
IPS W-stat -30.3885 0.0000 
Intermediate ADF Test Results on Ethanol Price 
State P-value Lag Max Lag Obs. 
Acre 0.0000 0 11 166 
Alagoas 0.0000 7 11 159 
Amapá 0.0000 0 11 166 
Amazonas 0.0000 4 11 162 
Bahia 0.0000 6 11 160 
Ceará 0.0000 9 11 157 
Distrito Federal 0.0000 8 11 158 
Espírito Santo 0.0000 7 11 159 
Goiás 0.0000 6 11 160 
Maranhão 0.0000 5 11 161 
Mato Grosso 0.0000 6 11 160 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.0000 6 11 160 
Minas Gerais 0.0000 6 11 160 
Pará 0.0000 5 11 161 
Paraíba 0.0000 11 11 155 
Paraná 0.0000 6 11 160 
Pernambuco 0.0000 4 11 162 
Piauí 0.0000 7 11 159 
Rio de Janeiro 0.0000 6 11 160 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.0000 8 11 158 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.0000 6 11 160 
Rondônia 0.0001 8 11 158 
Roraima 0.0000 7 11 159 
Santa Catarina 0.0000 7 11 159 
São Paulo 0.0000 6 11 160 
Sergipe 0.0000 7 11 159 
Tocantins 0.0000 5 11 161 
Note: Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process). P-values are computed assuming as-
ymptotic normality. Automatic lag length selection based on AIC: 0 to 11. 
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Table 5.10. IPS Unit Root Test: Individual effects of Gasoline Price (Levels) 
 
The p-values in Table 5.10 for IPS-W stat and Intermediate ADF Test indicate that the 
presence of a unit root in log_price_gasoline time series cannot be rejected in all cross-
sections for at least at 5% level of significance, which means that they are non-station-
ary in level form again justifying the initial hypothesis. 
Method Statistic P-value 
IPS W-stat -1.53683 0.0622 
Intermediate ADF Test Results on Ethanol Price 
State P-value Lag Max Lag Obs. 
Acre 0.1043 2 11 165 
Alagoas 0.9163 11 11 156 
Amapá 0.3285 5 11 162 
Amazonas 0.6576 0 11 167 
Bahia 0.4526 0 11 167 
Ceará 0.3990 0 11 167 
Distrito Federal 0.4021 0 11 167 
Espírito Santo 0.8581 11 11 156 
Goiás 0.3600 6 11 161 
Maranhão 0.3478 4 11 163 
Mato Grosso 0.0095 1 11 166 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.0832 5 11 162 
Minas Gerais 0.5795 5 11 162 
Pará 0.7652 4 11 163 
Paraíba 0.3568 5 11 162 
Paraná 0.5034 5 11 162 
Pernambuco 0.9625 10 11 157 
Piauí 0.0748 1 11 166 
Rio de Janeiro 0.1979 1 11 166 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.2687 0 11 167 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.0770 1 11 166 
Rondônia 0.7145 4 11 163 
Roraima 0.3786 5 11 162 
Santa Catarina 0.0585 1 11 166 
São Paulo 0.9528 11 11 156 
Sergipe 0.5402 3 11 164 
Tocantins 0.0158 1 11 166 
Note: Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process). P-values are computed assuming as-
ymptotic normality. Automatic lag length selection based on AIC: 0 to 10. 
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Table 5.11. IPS Unit Root Test: Individual effects of Gasoline Price (1st Diff.) 
 
The tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root when applied in difference form at least 
at 5% significance level as presented in Table 5.11. Thus d(log_price_gasoline) is I(0) in 
each state. 
 
Method Statistic P-value 
IPS W-stat -41.6888 0.0000 
Intermediate ADF Test Results on Ethanol Price 
State P-value Lag Max Lag Obs. 
Acre 0.0000 0 11 166 
Alagoas 0.0000 0 11 166 
Amapá 0.0000 4 11 162 
Amazonas 0.0000 5 11 161 
Bahia 0.0000 1 11 165 
Ceará 0.0000 2 11 164 
Distrito Federal 0.0000 4 11 162 
Espírito Santo 0.0000 6 11 160 
Goiás 0.0000 4 11 162 
Maranhão 0.0000 3 11 163 
Mato Grosso 0.0000 0 11 166 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.0000 0 11 166 
Minas Gerais 0.0000 0 11 166 
Pará 0.0000 0 11 166 
Paraíba 0.0000 4 11 162 
Paraná 0.0000 0 11 166 
Pernambuco 0.0000 6 11 160 
Piauí 0.0000 5 11 161 
Rio de Janeiro 0.0001 6 11 160 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.0000 1 11 165 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.0000 0 11 166 
Rondônia 0.0000 5 11 161 
Roraima 0.0000 0 11 166 
Santa Catarina 0.0000 1 11 165 
São Paulo 0.0000 1 11 165 
Sergipe 0.0000 0 11 166 
Tocantins 0.0000 1 11 165 
Note: Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process). P-values are computed assuming as-
ymptotic normality. Automatic lag length selection based on AIC: 0 to 10. 
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Table 5.12. ADF Fischer Unit Root Test: Individual effects of Ethanol Price (Levels) 
 
Furthermore, the p-values of the ADF Fisher Chi-square, the ADF- Choi Z-Statistic and 
Intermediate ADF test suggest that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected in 
levels at 5% significance level. 
Method Statistic P-value 
ADF Fisher Chi-square 56.4118 0.3849 
ADF- Choi Z-Stat -1.46599 0.0713 
Intermediate ADF Test Results on Ethanol Price 
State P-value Lag Max Lag Obs. 
Acre 0.4089 1 11 166 
Alagoas 0.3550 8 11 159 
Amapá 0.1941 1 11 166 
Amazonas 0.5862 5 11 162 
Bahia 0.4378 7 11 160 
Ceará 0.9536 10 11 157 
Distrito Federal 0.3330 7 11 160 
Espírito Santo 0.4523 8 11 159 
Goiás 0.2568 6 11 161 
Maranhão 0.5626 6 11 161 
Mato Grosso 0.2145 7 11 160 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.0966 7 11 160 
Minas Gerais 0.1141 7 11 160 
Pará 0.2154 6 11 161 
Paraíba 0.4526 6 11 161 
Paraná 0.3351 7 11 160 
Pernambuco 0.4518 5 11 162 
Piauí 0.2850 8 11 159 
Rio de Janeiro 0.3945 7 11 160 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.3255 9 11 158 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.3602 6 11 161 
Rondônia 0.4485 6 11 161 
Roraima 0.6010 7 11 160 
Santa Catarina 0.4934 8 11 159 
São Paulo 0.5485 7 11 160 
Sergipe 0.1969 8 11 159 
Tocantins 0.5676 6 11 161 
Note: Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process). P-values of Fischer Test are computed 
via asymptotic Chi- square distribution. Automatic Lag Length Selection based on AIC. 
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Table 5.13. ADF Fischer Unit Root Test: Individual effects of Ethanol Price (1st Diff.) 
 
However, the p-values in Table 5.13 support the rejection of the null for first the differ-
ences. So, again d(log_price_ethanol) is 𝐼(0) for each state. 
 
Method Statistic P-value 
ADF Fisher Chi-square 965.345 0.0000 
ADF- Choi Z-Stat -28.2827 0.0000 
Intermediate ADF Test Results on Ethanol Price 
State P-value Lag Max Lag Obs. 
Acre 0.0000 0 11 166 
Alagoas 0.0000 7 11 159 
Amapá 0.0000 0 11 166 
Amazonas 0.0000 4 11 162 
Bahia 0.0000 6 11 160 
Ceará 0.0000 9 11 157 
Distrito Federal 0.0000 8 11 158 
Espírito Santo 0.0000 7 11 159 
Goiás 0.0000 6 11 160 
Maranhão 0.0000 5 11 161 
Mato Grosso 0.0000 6 11 160 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.0000 6 11 160 
Minas Gerais 0.0000 6 11 160 
Pará 0.0000 5 11 161 
Paraíba 0.0000 11 11 155 
Paraná 0.0000 6 11 160 
Pernambuco 0.0000 4 11 162 
Piauí 0.0000 7 11 159 
Rio de Janeiro 0.0000 6 11 160 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.0000 8 11 158 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.0000 6 11 160 
Rondônia 0.0001 8 11 158 
Roraima 0.0000 7 11 159 
Santa Catarina 0.0000 7 11 159 
São Paulo 0.0000 6 11 160 
Sergipe 0.000 7 11 159 
Tocantins 0.0000 5 11 161 
Note: Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process). P-values of Fischer Test are computed 
via asymptotic Chi- square distribution. Automatic Lag Length Selection based on AIC. 
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Table 5.14. ADF Fischer Unit Root Test: Individual effects of Gasoline Price (Levels) 
 
Regarding log_price_gasoline, the p-values for the ADF Fisher Chi-square and the ADF- 
Choi Z-Statistic in Table 5.14 suggest that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be 
rejected in levels at 5% significance level. The Intermediate ADF Test fails to reject the 
null hypothesis except for the case of Mato Grosso and Tocantins. 
Method Statistic P-value 
ADF Fisher Chi-square 70.9837 0.0604 
ADF- Choi Z-Stat -1.46582 0.0713 
Intermediate ADF Test Results on Gasoline Price 
State P-value Lag Max Lag Obs. 
Acre 0.1043 2 11 165 
Alagoas 0.9163 11 11 156 
Amapá 0.3285 5 11 162 
Amazonas 0.6576 0 11 167 
Bahia 0.4526 0 11 167 
Ceará 0.3990 0 11 167 
Distrito Federal 0.4021 0 11 167 
Espírito Santo 0.8581 11 11 156 
Goiás 0.3600 6 11 161 
Maranhão 0.3478 4 11 163 
Mato Grosso 0.0095 1 11 166 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.0832 5 11 162 
Minas Gerais 0.5795 5 11 162 
Pará 0.7652 4 11 163 
Paraíba 0.3568 5 11 162 
Paraná 0.5034 5 11 162 
Pernambuco 0.9625 10 11 157 
Piauí 0.0748 1 11 166 
Rio de Janeiro 0.1979 1 11 166 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.2687 0 11 167 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.0770 1 11 166 
Rondônia 0.7145 4 11 163 
Roraima 0.3786 5 11 162 
Santa Catarina 0.0585 1 11 166 
São Paulo 0.9528 11 11 156 
Sergipe 0.5402 3 11 164 
Tocantins 0.0158 1 11 166 
Note: Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process). P-values of Fischer Test are computed 
via asymptotic Chi- square distribution. Automatic Lag Length Selection based on AIC. 
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Table 5.15. ADF Fischer Unit Root Test: Individual effects of Gasoline Price (1st Diff.) 
 
Moreover, the p-values in Table 5.15 support the rejection of the null for first differences. 
Thus, again d(log_price_gasoline) is 𝐼(0) for each state. 
So, both the individual and the panel unit root tests enter the same conclusion. Thus, the 
initial hypothesis of non-stationarity in levels is justified. 
Method Statistic P-value 
ADF Fisher Chi-square 1436.24 0.0000 
ADF- Choi Z-Stat -34.8392 0.0000 
Intermediate ADF Test Results on Gasoline Price 
State P-value Lag Max Lag Obs. 
Acre 0.0000 0 11 166 
Alagoas 0.0000 0 11 166 
Amapá 0.0000 4 11 162 
Amazonas 0.0000 5 11 161 
Bahia 0.0000 1 11 165 
Ceará 0.0000 2 11 164 
Distrito Federal 0.0000 4 11 162 
Espírito Santo 0.0000 6 11 160 
Goiás 0.0000 4 11 162 
Maranhão 0.0000 3 11 163 
Mato Grosso 0.0000 0 11 166 
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.0000 0 11 166 
Minas Gerais 0.0000 0 11 166 
Pará 0.0000 0 11 166 
Paraíba 0.0000 4 11 162 
Paraná 0.0000 0 11 166 
Pernambuco 0.0000 6 11 160 
Piauí 0.0000 5 11 161 
Rio de Janeiro 0.0001 6 11 160 
Rio Grande do Norte 0.0000 1 11 165 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.0000 0 11 166 
Rondônia 0.0000 5 11 161 
Roraima 0.0000 0 11 166 
Santa Catarina 0.0000 1 11 165 
São Paulo 0.0000 1 11 165 
Sergipe 0.0000 0 11 166 
Tocantins 0.0000 1 11 165 
Note: Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process). P-values of Fischer Test are computed 
via asymptotic Chi- square distribution. Automatic Lag Length Selection based on AIC. 
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5.2.2 Panel Cointegration Tests 
In order to define if a cointegrating relationship exists among the variables, Pedroni and 
Kao Panel Cointegration tests have been applied. The results are presented in Tables 5.16-
5.17 below: 
Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test 
Table 5.16 presents the results of both panel and group statistics: 
Table 5.16. Pedroni Panel Cointegration Tests 
 
EViews output for variance ratio-statistic, Rho-statistic, Phillips-Perron and Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF)-t statistic, strongly reveal panel cointegration of ethanol and gaso-
line price. P-value is equal to 0.00 at 5% for all cases in favor of rejection of the null 
hypothesis. More specifically, in the case of panel statistics, rejection of the null reveals 
that ethanol price and gasoline price are cointegrated in all states (cross sections). On the 
other hand, in the case of group statistics, rejection of the null hypothesis indicates coin-
tegrating relations among ethanol and gasoline price at least at one state. Thus there is a 
long run relationship among the variables on panel level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel Statistics Group Statistics 
 statistic P-value statistic P-value 
Variance Ratio 18.88518 0.0000 ----- ----- 
Rho-Statistic -15.21109 0.0000 -11.78928 0.0000 
PP-Statistic -9.636574 0.0000 -9.410533 0.0000 
ADF statistic -7.102783 0.0000 -7.000467 0.0000 
Note: The values presented above are distributed asymptotically as standard normal. Pedroni tests are 
in total left-sided, while variance ratio is right-sided. Trend assumption: No deterministic trend. The 
sign * stands for rejection of 𝐻0 of no cointegration. Level of significance is 0.05. 
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Kao Panel Cointegration Test 
The next step is to run Kao Panel Cointegration Test. The output is presented in Table 
5.17 below: 
Table 5.17. Kao Panel Cointegration Test 
 
Again Kao Cointegration test strongly reveals the cointegrating relationship between 
log_price_ethanol and log_price_gasoline at least at 5% significance level, since p-value 
of 0.00 is in favor of rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration. 
5.2.3 Pool Panel Analysis 
Since the output of panel unit root and cointegration tests have supported the existence of 
long-run equilibrium relationship between the pooled variables, then Fully Modified Or-
dinary Least Squares (FMOLS) have been applied towards estimation of individual long-
run estimates. The data used is the same as in previous panel data analysis. 
Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) 
Table 5.18 below presents the FMOLS analysis estimation output: 
 
Table 5.18. Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) 
 
The output reports a highly significant positive effect of log_price_gasoline on 
log_price_ethanol in the long-run on aggregate level. A ceteris paribus 1% increase in 
gasoline price causes a 1.30% increase in ethanol price in long run in Brazil, which is 
 Statistic P-value 
ADF -5.310871 0.0000 
Note: Null Hypothesis: No cointegration. Trend assumption: No deterministic trend. Automatic lag 
length selection based on AIC with a max lag of 11. Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and 
Bartlett kernel. 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic P-value 
log_price_gasoline 1.303398 82.17465 0.0000 
 (0.015861)   
Note: Dependent variable: log_price_ethanol. Cointegrating equation deterministics: C. Long-run co-
variance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth). Coefficient covariance computed 
using default method. 5% Level of Significance. 
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almost identical to the average value of 1.33 long-run elasticity estimated in time series 
analysis.  
Finally, towards a rather robust justification of FMOLS output, Dynamic Ordinary Least 
Squares (DOLS) results proposed by Stock and Watson (1994) are provided in Appendix 
in Table A.6 
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6 Conclusions 
This dissertation aims at studying the integration between ethanol and gasoline price re-
garding the 27 states of Brazil. It contributes to the existing literature by investigating the 
co-movement of the natural logarithms of both prices at state level, within time series and 
panel data analysis. Impulse Response Functions are employed within time series part. 
On the other hand, Pedroni and Kao panel cointegration tests and Fully Modified Ordi-
nary Least Squares are employed within panel data part. Use of monthly data for both 
price series for 2002-2015 period has enabled the study for a relatively extended time 
period, capturing both the introduction of flex fuel technology and the 2008 economic 
crisis. 
Regarding time series approach, Johansen cointegration Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue 
tests reveal a long-run relationship between ethanol and gasoline price in 10 out of the 27 
Brazilian states: in Goiás, Minas Gerais, Pará, Paraná, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, 
Rondônia, São Paulo, Sergipe and Tocantins at 5% and in Bahia, Minas Gerais, Pará, 
Paraná, Rio de Janeiro, Rondônia, São Paulo, Sergipe and Tocantins at 10% significance 
level. Long run elasticities of ethanol price with respect to gasoline price are estimated 
from the Vector Error Correction Models for the cointegrated states ranging from 1.07% 
in Rondônia to 1.66% in São Paulo and providing an average long-run elasticity of 1.33%. 
Thus, a ceteris paribus 1% increase in log_price_gasoline, causes a 1.33% increase in 
log_price_ethanol on average in the long-run. Speed of adjustment ranges from 8% in 
Tocantins to 28% in Paraná, providing an average of 16%. Thus, the system corrects the 
disequilibrium of the previous period at a speed of 16% to reach an equilibrium on aver-
age. The fact that the speed of adjustment is lower than past literature aggregate output 
may be attributed to the fact that flex fuel penetration hit a peak in 2010 and was followed 
by a lower rate and due to the economic crisis. Impulse responses reveal a relatively 
higher response in log_price_ethanol to a shock in log_price_gasoline than the reverse 
case, with a levelling-off process within the twelve-month horizon of 2016, except for the 
case of Tocantins. That might occur due to the relative size of both markets with gasoline 
market being rather international and ethanol market being of lower extent. 
75 
Regarding panel data analysis, Im, Pesaran and Shin and ADF Fisher unit root tests reveal 
non-stationarity for both price series at all states justifying the initial hypothesis and sta-
tionarity for first differenced price series again at all states. Pedroni and Kao Panel coin-
tegration test output is if favor of cointegration at panel level. Finally, FMOLS provide 
an aggregate long-run elasticity estimate of 1.30 that is almost identical to the average 
value from time series analysis. 
Knowledge on the specific price relationship might be a priceless tool towards further 
establishment of ethanol in developed and developing countries and enhancement of re-
search for oil substitutes towards elimination of environmental effects of fossil fuels and 
elimination of oil price volatility effects on national balances. Thus, it could boost etha-
nol’s share in international fuel market and dethrone gasoline’s present leading role to-
wards a less contaminating global energy matrix. 
Since the introduction and expansion of ethanol in international markets is part of the aim 
of the thesis, the historical and bibliographic overview and the econometric evidence are 
accompanied by a series of policy proposals and thoughts in order to provide an enhanced 
tool to policy makers of both developed and developing countries which aim at creating 
a policy framework that could establish ethanol market within their domestic market by 
sharing the Proálcool Program paradigm and avoiding mistakes of the past. 
To begin with, intellectual investment in an overall study detailing all the aspects of eth-
anol market and further discussions highlighting the strengths and past mistakes regarding 
Brazilian experience and Proálcool Program should be encouraged. Tropical regions such 
as Africa, America and Asia could implement Proálcool with employment and income 
gains, socioeconomic benefits and GHG reduction. With a scope of a gasoline phase-out, 
the growing motorization acts as a demand stressor, and thus, taxation could alleviate that 
problem, affect the adjustment of fuel prices to long term equilibrium positively and work 
as an instrument towards meeting environmental standards and correcting market failures. 
Furthermore, the crucial role of maintaining high levels of ethanol supply, even in periods 
of low production by imports, should be pointed out towards policy makers. 
Additionally, the integration of ethanol with other industrial sectors and final consump-
tion, such as flex-fuel motorbikes, use in biodegradable plastics and substitute of costly 
and polluting methanol should be highlighted together with the investment in infrastruc-
ture of fuel transportation. Socioeconomic factors and environmental concerns need to be 
taken into account in policy planning, especially regarding expected short-run ethanol 
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demand. Furthermore, mandatory blend and other current policies should be put under 
question since time of fuel substitution is becoming shorter over time and consequently, 
stability of supply might be affected. Last, but not least, FFV share has to be increased 
significantly, to lead towards increasing ethanol consumption to determined mandate 
level. Price parity of 0.7 needs to be abide by, as consumers’ incentive towards ethanol 
use. 
Finally, considering for further research, an analysis that consists of both time series and 
panel data approach, covering a time period that captures both pre-flex-fuel era and eco-
nomic crisis, accounting for possible structural breaks and embodying spatial-related var-
iables is suggested. Some possible spatial considerations could be the ones suggested in 
Nuñez and Otero’s (2015) paper with the 2015 update in tax regimes reaching up to 10% 
differential between ethanol and gasoline taxation in favor of the former in some states. 
Some other key determinants could be OPEC’s recent decision to reduce oil production 
due to geopolitical reasons that will cause further increase in gasoline price, weather con-
ditions that affect sugarcane harvests, environmental concerns and the increased blending 
mandate from 25 to 27.5%.
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Appendix 
Figures A.1.a- A.1.aa.: Time-Series Graphs 
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Figure A.1.f. Ceará 
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Table A.1 VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria: Schwarz Information Criterion 
 
Table A.1 (continued). VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria: Schwarz Information Criterion 
 
 
 
Lag Acre Alagoas Amapa Amazonas Bahia Ceará 
Distrito 
Federal 
Espírito 
Santo 
0 -4.314473 -3.294015 -4.041317 -3.489843 -3.574039 -3.432755 -3.432755 -3.494825 
1 -10.40422 -9.753905 -8.862731 -8.615308 -8.957279  -8.097010*  -8.097010* -8.809033 
2  -10.45517*  -10.04509*  -8.994667*  -8.766041* -8.960193 -8.089704 -8.089704  -8.923780* 
3 -10.37061 -9.990461 -8.886676 -8.641282 -8.857432 -7.984714 -7.984714 -8.821533 
4 -10.28355 -9.959177 -8.771933 -8.627489  -8.978597* -7.908728 -7.908728 -8.851421 
5 -10.17034 -9.923653 -8.716182 -8.518515 -8.883388 -7.809049 -7.809049 -8.805708 
6 -10.05982 -9.806913 -8.622579 -8.456295 -8.76432 -7.73592 -7.73592 -8.697153 
7 -9.966402 -9.712007 -8.515862 -8.351799 -8.690312 -7.613967 -7.613967 -8.615781 
8 -9.852532 -9.616042 -8.415812 -8.229147 -8.592814 -7.574145 -7.574145 -8.554869 
9 -9.774205 -9.547047 -8.330072 -8.241152 -8.51666 -7.452194 -7.452194 -8.481216 
10 -9.68757 -9.548396 -8.240368 -8.114447 -8.441641 -7.40059 -7.40059 -8.409877 
11 -9.624236 -9.493732 -8.156817 -7.998885 -8.370609 -7.273745 -7.273745 -8.370351 
12 -9.542207 -9.424539 -8.077757 -7.904268 -8.266294 -7.148987 -7.148987 -8.277035 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
Lag Goiás Maranhão 
Mato 
Grosso 
Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Minas  
Gerais 
Pará Paraíba Paraná 
0 -3.192713 -3.333646 -3.294814 -3.815969 -3.618018 -4.471832 -3.851366 -3.278798 
1 -7.979801 -9.507703 -8.421089 -8.977524 -9.385841 -10.32302 -9.595286  -8.036700* 
2  -8.130951*  -9.832452*  -8.532428*  -9.056068*  -9.483675*  -10.41870*  -9.865876* -8.032348 
3 -8.056732 -9.740185 -8.464974 -8.952945 -9.395691 -10.33275 -9.778085 -7.933487 
4 -8.040026 -9.735269 -8.371464 -8.945802 -9.473304 -10.3808 -9.815791 -7.931025 
5 -7.987873 -9.637119 -8.30403 -8.876611 -9.391386 -10.29972 -9.787805 -7.849686 
6 -7.928229 -9.55844 -8.175961 -8.79222 -9.308008 -10.19045 -9.688973 -7.772094 
7 -7.872137 -9.457384 -8.123712 -8.728014 -9.191099 -10.07114 -9.586454 -7.657454 
8 -7.771339 -9.339245 -8.03697 -8.609706 -9.076596 -9.961364 -9.479794 -7.59238 
9 -7.659754 -9.267025 -7.918527 -8.503812 -8.963452 -9.845062 -9.419544 -7.475368 
10 -7.604524 -9.218916 -7.823482 -8.393655 -8.864166 -9.784487 -9.327198 -7.404308 
11 -7.506296 -9.194705 -7.727375 -8.325776 -8.759182 -9.736623 -9.251066 -7.300296 
12 -7.408815 -9.101213 -7.624085 -8.221728 -8.684561 -9.733048 -9.12653 -7.222663 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
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Table A.1 (continued). VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria: Schwarz Information Criterion 
 
 
 
 
Lag Pernambuco Piauí 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
Rio Grande 
do Norte 
Rio Grande 
do Sul 
Rondônia Roraima 
Santa Cata-
rina 
0 -3.273542 -3.996245 -3.684754 -3.282904 -3.591618 -4.187232 -3.44391 -3.693961 
1 -9.160043 -9.208258 -9.661055 -9.156325 -8.374595 -10.18554 -9.042791 -9.147581 
2  -9.450187*  -9.381153*  -9.960313*  -9.380169*  -8.434994*  -10.33502* -9.197148  -9.234003* 
3 -9.337375 -9.295473 -9.850821 -9.29841 -8.336833 -10.23433 -9.168269 -9.135343 
4 -9.298467 -9.320124 -9.891911 -9.343893 -8.283615 -10.31607  -9.203368* -9.099222 
5 -9.225794 -9.244946 -9.85633 -9.293213 -8.183403 -10.22703 -9.084475 -9.061741 
6 -9.174649 -9.138359 -9.739593 -9.186797 -8.062937 -10.11469 -9.023867 -8.957773 
7 -9.059559 -9.030166 -9.640799 -9.095403 -7.974703 -10.01075 -8.919038 -8.872787 
8 -8.982552 -8.925571 -9.543604 -8.992925 -7.865356 -9.892038 -8.844309 -8.762068 
9 -8.892859 -8.844216 -9.424444 -8.880414 -7.747443 -9.80617 -8.78834 -8.670146 
10 -8.793066 -8.768838 -9.34135 -8.815708 -7.674075 -9.765758 -8.671784 -8.553595 
11 -8.759142 -8.685461 -9.258738 -8.809425 -7.590057 -9.698524 -8.596513 -8.476219 
12 -8.656061 -8.59035 -9.194587 -8.698922 -7.501678 -9.588597 -8.512761 -8.350196 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
Lag São Paulo Sergipe Tocantins 
0 -2.843201 -3.803719 -3.726212 
1 -8.453615 -10.11740 -9.584258 
2  -8.628164* -10.26014  -9.935996* 
3 -8.532384 -10.16346 -9.859604 
4 -8.507899  -10.30457* -9.854186 
5 -8.43922 -10.20123 -9.798702 
6 -8.330776 -10.07905 -9.710948 
7 -8.223502 -9.996534 -9.592886 
8 -8.168204 -9.882667 -9.474107 
9 -8.045564 -9.815276 -9.360038 
10 -8.021265 -9.721850 -9.271184 
11 -7.9439 -9.632061 -9.185163 
12 -7.856459 -3.803719 -9.143917 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
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Table A.2 (continued). Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Trace 
 
Table A.2 (continued). Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Trace 
 
Table A.2 (continued). Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Trace 
 
𝐻0: Acre* Alagoas Amapa Amazonas Bahia*** Ceará 
Distrito 
Federal 
r=0 
34.16507 10.36248 22.02518 19.96380 26.10546 22.01612 60.66243 
[0.0037] [0.9086] [0.1400] [0.2277] [0.0468] [0.1403] [0.0000] 
r≤1 
0.067595 2.598336 6.939141 7.552106 7.275631 3.834293 22.29386 
[0.0703] [0.9205] [0.3509] [0.2905] [0.3166] [0.7660] [0.0009] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted). MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
𝐻0: 
Espírito 
Santo 
Goiás*** 
Maranhão 
*** 
Mato 
 Grosso 
Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Minas 
 Ge-
rais*** 
Pará 
r=0 
14.88334 31.46829 26.47561 33.75684 22.62818 34.39320 21.91355 
[0.5843] [0.0090] [0.0420] [0.0042] [0.1203] [0.0034] [0.1439] 
r≤1 
4.161261 9.591566 8.507620 13.04274 6.959537 6.637830 4.229268 
[0.7187] [0.1469] [0.2130] [0.0408] [0.3488] [0.3838] [0.7087] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted). MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
𝐻0: Paraíba** Paraná*** 
Pernam-
buco 
Piauí 
Rio de 
Janeiro*** 
Rio 
Grande do 
Norte*** 
Rio Grande 
do Sul*** 
r=0 
25.85189 36.55174 23.00028 19.50868 30.09925 34.67112 31.62802 
[0.0503] [0.0016] [0.1093] [0.2518] [0.0140] [0.0031] [0.0086] 
r≤1 
5.742434 8.224412 4.710641 6.521535 9.514792 5.003353 8.372719 
[0.4937] [0.2339] [0.6383] [0.3971] [0.1509] [0.5959] [0.2227] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted). MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
𝐻0: Rondônia*** Roraima 
Santa  
Catarina*** 
São 
Paulo*** 
Sergipe** 
Tocantins 
*** 
r=0 
29.17169 12.01877 27.27733 27.93944 25.55339 25.91847 
[0.0187] [0.1560] [0.0332] [0.0273] [0.0547] [0.0493] 
r≤1 
7.527774 1.890788 10.11215 5.048593 8.345381 9.909364 
[0.2927] [0.1691] [0.1222] [0.5894] [0.2248] [0.1313] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted). MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
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Table A.4. Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Maximum Eigenvalue 
 
Table A.4 (continued). Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Maximum Eigenvalue 
 
Table A.4 (continued). Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test - Maximum Eigenvalue 
 
 
 
 
Level of Significance 5% 10% 
𝐻0< and 𝐻1> 48% (13 of 27) 52%(14 of 27) 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted). MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
𝐻0: Acre* Alagoas Amapa Amazonas Bahia*** Ceará 
Distrito 
Federal 
r=0 
22.54707 7.764141 15.08604 12.41170 26.10546 18.18182 38.36857 
[0.0168] [0.8421] [0.1890] [0.3778] [0.0468] [0.0741] [0.0000] 
r≤1 
11.61800 2.598336 6.939141 7.552106 7.275631 3.834293 22.29386 
[0.0703] [ 0.9205] [0.3509] [0.2905] [0.3166] [0.7660] [0.0009] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted). MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
𝐻0: 
Espírito 
Santo 
Goiás*** Maranhão 
Mato 
 Grosso 
Mato 
Grosso do 
Sul 
Minas 
 Ge-
rais*** 
Pará 
r=0 
10.72208 21.87672 17.96799 20.71411 15.66864 27.75537 17.68429 
[0.5422] [0.0213] [0.0794] [0.0319] [0.1600] [0.0024] [0.0869] 
r≤1 
4.161261 9.591566 0.169402 13.04274 6.959537 6.637830 4.229268 
[0.9162] [0.1469] [0.6806] [0.0408] [0.3488] [0.3838] [0.7087] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted). MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
𝐻0: 
Paraíba 
*** 
Paraná*** 
Pernam-
buco 
Piauí 
Rio de 
Janeiro*** 
Rio 
Grande do 
Norte*** 
Rio Grande 
do Sul*** 
r=0 
20.10945 28.32733 18.28964 12.98714 20.58445 29.66777 23.25531 
[0.0392] [0.0019] [0.0716] [0.3291] [0.0334] [0.0011] [0.0130] 
r≤1 
5.742434 8.224412 4.710641 6.521535 9.514792 5.003353 8.372719 
[0.4937] [0.2339] [0.6383] [0.3971] [0.1509] [0.5959] [0.2227] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted). MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
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Table A.5. Cointegrating Equations (%) - Maximum Eigenvalue 
 
Table A.6. Panel Dynamic Least Squares (DOLS) 
 
𝐻0: Rondônia*** Roraima*** 
Santa  
Catarina 
São 
Paulo*** 
Sergipe Tocantins 
r=0 
21.64392 23.90814 17.16518 22.89084 17.20801 16.00910 
[0.0231] [0.0102] [0.1022] [0.0148] [0.1008] [0.1448] 
r≤1 
7.527774 4.742465 10.11215 5.048593 8.345381 9.909364 
[0.2927] [0.6336] [0.1222] [0.5894] [0.2248] [0.1313] 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted). MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
Level of Significance 5% 10% 
𝐻0< and 𝐻1> 44% (12 of 27) 41%(11 of 27) 
Note: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend (restricted). MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-
values. 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic P-value 
log_price_gasoline 1.331612 79.56008 0.0000 
 (0.016737)   
Note: Cointegrating equation deterministics: C. Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, 
Newey-West fixed bandwidth). Coefficient covariance computed using default method. 5% Level of 
Significance. 
